## 1AC

### Advantage 1

#### Pyro-processing is key to stop climate change we’re close to the tipping point.

Steve Kirsch, 11-25-2009, M.S. Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), writer for the Huffington Post, CEO Kirsch foundation on climate, founder/head of Center for Energy and Climate Change, National Award from the Caring Institute in Washington DC, written much about the Integral Fast Reactor, Fellow, with the Science Council for Global Initiatives (SCGI), Steve Kirsch’s blog, “Why We Should Build an Integral Fast Reactor Now,” <http://skirsch.wordpress.com/2009/11/25/ifr/>

\*\*\*cites Charles Till, former Associate Director, Argonne National Laboratory, The National Academy Studies, James Hansen, Director, NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, Ray Hunter, former Deputy Director of the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Leonard Koch, winner of the Global Energy International Prize, Barry Brook Sir Hubert Wilkins Chair of Climate Change\*\*\*

To prevent a climate disaster, we must eliminate virtually all coal plant emissions worldwide in 25 years. The best way and, for all practical purposes, the only way to get all countries off of coal is not with coercion; it is to make them want to replace their coal burners by giving them a plug-compatible technology that is less expensive. The IFR can do this. It is plug-compatible with the burners in a coal plant (see Nuclear Power: Going Fast). No other technology can upgrade a coal plant so it is greenhouse gas free while reducing operating costs at the same time. In fact, no other technology can achieve either of these goals. The IFR can achieve both. The bottom line is that without the IFR (or a yet-to-be-invented technology with similar ability to replace the coal burner with a cheaper alternative), it is unlikely that we’ll be able to keep CO2 under 450 ppm. Today, the IFR is the only technology with the potential to displace the coal burner. That is why restarting the IFR is so critical and why Jim Hansen has listed it as one of the top five things we must do to avert a climate disaster.[4] Without eliminating virtually all coal emissions by 2030, the sum total of all of our other climate mitigation efforts will be inconsequential. Hansen often refers to the near complete phase-out of carbon emissions from coal plants worldwide by 2030 as the sine qua non for climate stabilization (see for example, the top of page 6 in his August 4, 2008 trip report). To stay under 450ppm, we would have to install about 13,000 GWe of new carbon-free power over the next 25 years. That number was calculated by Nathan Lewis of Caltech for the Atlantic, but others such as Saul Griffith have independently derived a very similar number and White House Science Advisor John Holdren used 5,600 GWe to 7,200 GWe in his presentation to the Energy Bar Association Annual Meeting on April 23, 2009. That means that if we want to save the planet, we must install more than 1 GWe per day of clean power every single day for the next 25 years. That is a very, very tough goal. It is equivalent to building one large nuclear reactor per day, or 1,500 huge wind turbines per day, or 80,000 37 foot diameter solar dishes covering 100 square miles every day, or some linear combination of these or other carbon free power generation technologies. Note that the required rate is actually higher than this because Hansen and Rajendra Pachauri, the chair of the IPCC, now both agree that 350ppm is a more realistic “not to exceed” number (and we’ve already exceeded it). Today, we are nowhere close to that installation rate with renewables alone. For example, in 2008, the average power delivered by solar worldwide was only 2 GWe (which is to be distinguished from the peak solar capacity of 13.4GWe). That is why every renewable expert at the 2009 Aspen Institute Environment Forum agreed that nuclear must be part of the solution. Al Gore also acknowledges that nuclear must play an important role. Nuclear has always been the world’s largest source of carbon free power. In the US, for example, even though we haven’t built a new nuclear plant in the US for 30 years, nuclear still supplies 70% of our clean power!

#### Electricity demand is rising and solving electricity is the first step to solve climate change because without nuclear power warming is inevitable.

Barry Brook et. al, 2-21-2009, a leading environmental scientist, holding the Sir Hubert Wilkins Chair of Climate Change at the School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, and is also Director of Climate Science at the University of Adelaide’s Environment Institute, published three books, over 200 refereed scientific papers, is a highly cited researcher, received a number of distinguished awards for his research excellence including the Australian Academy of Science Fenner Medal, is an International Award Committee member for the Global Energy Prize, Australian Research Council Future Fellow, ISI Researcher, Ph.D., Macquarie University in Environmental Engineering, Science Council for Global Initiatives, Edgeworth David Medal Royal Society of NSW, Cosmos Bright Sparks Award, Tom Blees is the author of Prescription for the Planet, the president of the Science Council for Global Initiatives, member of the selection committee for the Global Energy Prize, George S. Stanford is a nuclear reactor physicist, part of the team that developed the Integral Fast Reactor, PhD from Stanford University in Physics, Masters from University of Virginia in Engineering, worked at Argonne National Laboratory, Graham R.L. Cowan, "Boron: A Better Energy Carrier than Hydrogen?" in 2001, published "How Fire Can Be Tamed," BraveNewClimate, “Response to an Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) critique,” <http://bravenewclimate.com/2009/02/21/response-to-an-integral-fast-reactor-ifr-critique/>

[TB] Almost 80% of greenhouse gas emissions come from nuclear-capable countries anyway, so even if we just deployed them there we could make tremendous strides, though it would still be wise to create some sort of international oversight organization as I propose in the book. [BWB] This is at best grossly disingenuous (not to mention insulting to call Kirsch stupid). You need to solve the electricity carbon problem to fix the vehicular fuels problem, space heating and embedded energy in building and manufactured goods, and Tom has a solution for MSW [municipal solid waste] also. About half of agricultural emissions can also be solved if you have a zero-carbon energy source. Then you just need to worry about the ruminant methane and carbon from deforestation. But the bottom line is, if you fix electricity, everything else will quicktly start to fall into place. If we don’t stop coal in places like China and India, we’re hosed, irrespective of what we might do in the US and Oz (and even if we could do with without advanced nuclear, which we very likely cannot). I do wonder, what is Jim Green’s plan is for replacing the 484 GW of coal-fired power stations already installed in China, and the further 200 or so plants in the planning or construction pipeline?

#### Nuclear power is the most economic source of base-load power it’s key to solve GHG emissions by displacing pollutants.

Alexander DeVolpi, 2-28-2010, been active in nuclear-arms policy and treaty-verification technology studies for over 25 years, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Illinois (and other national laboratories) involved nearly 40 years of lab, field, and analytical activities in instrumentation, nuclear physics, nuclear engineering, reactor safety, radioisotopes, experiments, verification technology, and arms control, the Defense Nuclear Agency, On-Site Inspection Agency, all the Department of Energy weapons labs, with the Departments of Defense and State, author or coauthor of several books, Ph.D. in physics (and MS in nuclear engineering physics) from Virginia Polytechnic Institute, certificate from the Argonne International Institute of Nuclear Science and Engineering, managing nuclear diagnostics for the Reactor Analysis and Safety Division at Argonne, and becoming technical manager of the arms-control and nonproliferation program, Who’s Who in Frontiers of Science and Technology, American Men and Women of Science, fellow of the American Physical Society, technical consultant in the Federation of American Scientists/Natural Resources Defense Council joint project, ScienceTechnologyHistory, “NUCLEAR EXPERTISE: The Amory Lovins Charade,” <http://sciencetechnologyhistory.wordpress.com/article/nuclear-expertise-the-amory-lovins-1gsyt5k142kc5-20/>

Nuclear power is not only commercially competitive, but extremely safe (no coal miners dying), no air pollution at all, no greenhouse gas emissions (such as carbon-dioxide). Nuclear-plant lifetime is being doubled from 30 to 60 years (which utilities, investors, and ratepayers appreciate). If Lovins had his way 30 years ago, considerably more particulates and gases would have been vented to the local and regional atmosphere from coal-fired plants (aside from the greenhouse gases emitted). Moreover, if Lovins had his way, we would not have conserved the electricity-equivalent in domestic coal, imported and domestic oil, and domestic and imported natural-gas resources and reserves that we have for 30 years. A typical nuclear power plant each year avoids consumption of 3.4 million short tons of coal, or 65.8 billion cubic feet of natural gas, or 14 billion barrels of oil. (The United States has ample uranium resources.) So Lovins was wrong in implying that nuclear had no overriding societal or environmental benefits. Incidentally, it’s no accident that Illinois has the highest concentration of nuclear-power plants in the United States: Argonne National Laboratory can be proud of its half-century nuclear stewardship. (California, by the way, generates more electricity from geothermal, solar, and wind energy sources combined than any other State.) Lovins displayed complex viewgraphs that, he purports, show that nuclear is the costliest of “low-or-non-nuclear resources.” Yet, in the last 30 years, nuclear has displaced half the fossil-fuel combustion in Illinois while still being competitive. Inasmuch as nuclear-power plants emit no byproduct carbon-dioxide to the atmosphere, surely his claim that it is the costliest of low-carbon-emission sources fails the smell test. Most of Lovins’ pricing and cost/benefit comparisons are based on “new delivered electricity” which frames the cost of U.S. domestic nuclear construction in the least favorable light. He declares nuclear power an economic failure. Can someone explain that to my bank account which has benefitted from compounding competitive electric power savings for the past 30 years? His rimy claim certainly fails the ripeness test. On the issue of electrical-grid reliability, Lovins asserts that there is no such thing as a “outage-free” source of electrical power. He must think that nuclear power runs by government fiat. Nuclear is a fixture on the grid because it is more economical to operate as base-load supply, while sources less reliable, intermittent, and more costly (such as wind, solar, and gas) provide supplementary power. During the past 30 years in Illinois, I don’t recall having the electricity supply and cost problems that California has had after it prohibited nuclear-power plants from being built within its borders. By the way, average U.S. nuclear capacity factor was about 92% in 2007. That’s excellent. Lovins pitiful effort to undermine the reliability of nuclear power egregiously fails the smell test.

#### We could start building hundreds of IFR’s by 2015 – cost competitive option.

Steve Kirsch, 2011, M.S. Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), writer for the Huffington Post, CEO Kirsch foundation on climate, founder/head of Center for Energy and Climate Change, National Award from the Caring Institute in Washington DC, written much about the Integral Fast Reactor, Fellow, with the Science Council for Global Initiatives (SCGI), Steve Kirsch’s blog, “The Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) project: Q&A,” <http://skirsch.com/politics/globalwarming/ifrQandA.htm>

\*\*\*cites Charles Till, former Associate Director, Argonne National Laboratory, The National Academy Studies, James Hansen, Director, NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, Ray Hunter, former Deputy Director of the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Leonard Koch, winner of the Global Energy International Prize, Barry Brook Sir Hubert Wilkins Chair of Climate Change\*\*\*

I do not agree that nuclear energy would be "a costly option," especially given a level playing field (external health and environmental costs considered, for instance). Nuclear power is now competitive in many countries, and there is no reason to think that fast reactors, in the long run, will be significantly more expensive. They will require no mining, no milling, no enrichment, and the waste-management expense will be negligible. The raw material for the fuel (used fuel already on hand) is essentially free. Virtually the entire cost will be in infrastructure and operations. It's likely if we made this a national priority, it could move a lot faster (like we did with the Manhattan Project). The argument that it might take a long time is an argument for starting immediately. Nobody, even the critics, have suggested that waiting around makes it happen faster when we finally need to do it. We need to get out from under a "let's just pursue the quick fixes" mentality we have now. The time to do these longer term projects is before they are needed. Are we going to wait for our existing nuclear material to be depleted before it is a crisis? And then, once again, we will be too late. We need forward, visionary thinking in this country. It seems to be in short supply. Here's what Blees wrote in response to my answer above: I couldn't agree more. That said, I'm certain it could be done expeditiously and we could start building these things by the hundreds by 2015 or so. Meanwhile we could start building ABWRs and the other Gen III+ reactors so we could start shutting down coal plants. Nuclear waste is simply not an issue. And in terms of building both Gen III and IFRs in nuclear-capable countries, neither is economics. Or safety. Or proliferation. Those who maintain that we don't have the technology are either ignorant of the facts or lying. Not to put too fine a point on it or anything. That's not something I'd just toss out there, but just between you and me that's the way I see it.

#### Nuclear power is needed before renewables, it’s the jumpstart for new clean energy leadership – scientific consensus.

Steve Kirsch, 11-25-2009, M.S. Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), writer for the Huffington Post, CEO Kirsch foundation on climate, founder/head of Center for Energy and Climate Change, National Award from the Caring Institute in Washington DC, written much about the Integral Fast Reactor, Fellow, with the Science Council for Global Initiatives (SCGI), Steve Kirsch’s blog, “Why We Should Build an Integral Fast Reactor Now,” <http://skirsch.wordpress.com/2009/11/25/ifr/>

\*\*\*cites Charles Till, former Associate Director, Argonne National Laboratory, The National Academy Studies, James Hansen, Director, NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, Ray Hunter, former Deputy Director of the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Leonard Koch, winner of the Global Energy International Prize, Barry Brook Sir Hubert Wilkins Chair of Climate Change\*\*\*

Nuclear can be installed very rapidly; much more rapidly than renewables. For example, about two thirds of the currently operating 440 reactors around the world came online during a 10 year period between 1980 and 1990. So our best chance of meeting the required installation of new power goal and saving the planet is with an aggressive nuclear program. Unlike renewables, nuclear generates base load power, reliably, regardless of weather. Nuclear also uses very little land area. It does not require the installation of new power lines since it can be installed where the power is needed. However, even with a very aggressive plan involving nuclear, it will still be extremely difficult to install clean power fast enough. Unfortunately, even in the US, we have no plan to install the clean power we need fast enough to save the planet. Even if every country were to agree tomorrow to completely eliminate their coal plant emissions by 2030, how do we think they are actually going to achieve that? There is no White House plan that explains this. There is no DOE plan. There is no plan or strategy. The deadlines will come and go and most countries will profusely apologize for not meeting their goals, just like we have with most of the signers of the Kyoto Protocol today. Apologies are nice, but they will not restore the environment. We need a strategy that is believable, practical, and affordable for countries to adopt. The IFR offers our best hope of being a centerpiece in such a strategy because it is the only technology we know of that can provide an economically compelling reason to change. At a speech at MIT on October 23, 2009, President Obama said “And that’s why the world is now engaged in a peaceful competition to determine the technologies that will power the 21st century. … The nation that wins this competition will be the nation that leads the global economy. I am convinced of that. And I want America to be that nation, it’s that simple.” Nuclear is our best clean power technology and the IFR is our best nuclear technology. The Gen IV International Forum (GIF) did a study in 2001-2002 of 19 different reactor designs on 15 different criteria and 24 metrics. The IFR ranked #1 overall. Over 242 experts from around the world participated in the study. It was the most comprehensive evaluation of competitive nuclear designs ever done. Top DOE nuclear management ignored the study because it didn’t endorse the design the Bush administration wanted. The IFR has been sitting on the shelf for 15 years and the DOE currently has no plans to change that. How does the US expect to be a leader in clean energy by ignoring our best nuclear technology? Nobody I’ve talked to has been able to answer that question. We have the technology (it was running for 30 years before we were ordered to tear it down). And we have the money: The Recovery Act has $80 billion dollars.

#### Climate change is real and anthropogenic – fundamental science, atmospheric patterns, greenhouse gas fingerprints, and newest measurements all confirm.

Karl Braganza, 6-14-2011, received his PhD from the School of Mathematics at Monash University, work has centered on understanding and attributing climate variability and change, using numerical modeling, instrumental observations and past climate evidence, currently the Head of Climate Monitoring at the Bureau of Meteorology's National Climate Center, The Conversation, "The Greenhouse Effect is Real: Here’s Why," <http://theconversation.edu.au/the-greenhouse-effect-is-real-heres-why-1515>

The greenhouse effect is fundamental science It would be easy to form the opinion that everything we know about climate change is based upon the observed rise in global temperatures and observed increase in carbon dioxide emissions since the industrial revolution. In other words, one could have the mistaken impression that the entirety of climate science is based upon a single correlation study. In reality, the correlation between global mean temperature and carbon dioxide over the 20th century forms an important, but very small part of the evidence for a human role in climate change. Our assessment of the future risk from the continued buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is even less informed by 20th century changes in global mean temperature. For example, our understanding of the greenhouse effect – the link between greenhouse gas concentrations and global surface air temperature – is based primarily on our fundamental understanding of mathematics, physics, astronomy and chemistry. Much of this science is textbook material that is at least a century old and does not rely on the recent climate record. For example, it is a scientific fact that Venus, the planet most similar to Earth in our solar system, experiences surface temperatures of nearly 500 degrees Celsius due to its atmosphere being heavily laden with greenhouse gases. Back on Earth, that fundamental understanding of the physics of radiation, combined with our understanding of climate change from the geological record, clearly demonstrates that increasing greenhouse gas concentrations will inevitably drive global warming. Dusting for climate fingerprints The observations we have taken since the start of 20th century have confirmed our fundamental understanding of the climate system. While the climate system is very complex, observations have shown that our formulation of the physics of the atmosphere and oceans is largely correct, and ever improving. Most importantly, the observations have confirmed that human activities, in particular a 40% increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations since the late 19th century, have had a discernible and significant impact on the climate system already. In the field known as detection and attribution of climate change, scientists use indicators known as fingerprints of climate change. These fingerprints show the entire climate system has changed in ways that are consistent with increasing greenhouse gases and an enhanced greenhouse effect. They also show that recent, long term changes are inconsistent with a range of natural causes. Is it getting hot in here? A warming world is obviously the most profound piece of evidence. Here in Australia, the decade ending in 2010 has easily been the warmest since record keeping began, and continues a trend of each decade being warmer than the previous, that extends back 70 years. Globally, significant warming and other changes have been observed across a range of different indicators and through a number of different recording instruments, and a consistent picture has now emerged. Scientists have observed increases in continental temperatures and increases in the temperature of the lower atmosphere. In the oceans, we have seen increases in sea-surface temperatures as well as increases in deep-ocean heat content. That increased heat has expanded the volume of the oceans and has been recorded as a rise in sea-level. Scientists have also observed decreases in sea-ice, a general retreat of glaciers and decreases in snow cover. Changes in atmospheric pressure and rainfall have also occurred in patterns that we would expect due to increased greenhouse gases. There is also emerging evidence that some, though not all, types of extreme weather have become more frequent around the planet. These changes are again consistent with our expectations for increasing atmospheric carbon dioxide. Patterns of temperature change that are uniquely associated with the enhanced greenhouse effect, and which have been observed in the real world include: greater warming in polar regions than tropical regions greater warming over the continents than the oceans greater warming of night time temperatures than daytime temperatures greater warming in winter compared with summer a pattern of cooling in the high atmosphere (stratosphere) with simultaneous warming in the lower atmosphere (troposphere).

#### Even if there is only a one percent chance fast reactors can work you vote aff because the planet is at stake.

Steve Kirsch, 11-25-2009, M.S. Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), writer for the Huffington Post, CEO Kirsch foundation on climate, founder/head of Center for Energy and Climate Change, National Award from the Caring Institute in Washington DC, written much about the Integral Fast Reactor, Fellow, with the Science Council for Global Initiatives (SCGI), Steve Kirsch’s blog, “Why We Should Build an Integral Fast Reactor Now,” <http://skirsch.wordpress.com/2009/11/25/ifr/>

\*\*\*cites Charles Till, former Associate Director, Argonne National Laboratory, The National Academy Studies, James Hansen, Director, NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, Ray Hunter, former Deputy Director of the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Leonard Koch, winner of the Global Energy International Prize, Barry Brook Sir Hubert Wilkins Chair of Climate Change\*\*\*

Even if you believe all the arguments of the opposition and completely discount the arguments of the Argonne scientists who best know the technology, it doesn’t matter because we do not have an option: we have to make this work now. Renewables alone can’t kill coal in the time allotted. The point is:1) virtually every credible renewable expert agrees we cannot reduce our carbon emissions enough without nuclear, 2) the IFR is our best nuclear, 3) the IFR is the only technology we have with a realistic chance of replacing coal burners in a coal plant with a lower-cost carbon-free alternative. So objections noted, but our planet is at stake and we have got to make this work. We should be joining together and doing things that our most credible scientists tell us we have to do to save our planet, rather than arguing amongst ourselves and debating what the optimum solution is. The time for debate is over. We are so late on deploying clean energy technologies that any new technology that has a realistic potential to make a significant positive impact should be welcomed with open arms by every human being. Urgency “Within the next four decades, human civilization must eliminate its use of fossil fuels and replace them with 10,000 gigawatts of reliable, sustainable power. The only realistic way that this extraordinary challenge can be met is with the rapid and large-scale deployment of nuclear power, on a worldwide basis, led by countries like the US, Russia, the EU, China and India. Generation III nuclear plants will be critical to this expansion over the short term, Generation IV technology is the astoundingly attractive long-term prospect, with the IFR being the flagship Gen IV design. The urgency in getting the IFR commercialised and deployment on an industrial scale cannot be overstated”.

### Advantage 2

#### Decline in domestic nuclear infrastructure has spurred both a brain drain and an inability to attract the best and brightest

Martin, Chairman of the Nuclear Energy Advisory Committee, and Ahearne, Vice-Chairman, 8 (William F. and John, Nuclear Energy: Policies and Technology for the 21st Century, Nuclear Energy Advisory Committee, November 2008, http://www.ne.doe.gov/neac/neacPDFs/NEAC\_Final\_Report\_Web%20Version.pdf, da 9-1-12)

The consequences of a weakened nuclear infrastructure in the United States include reduced domestic capability to support the role of nuclear energy as well as the related problem of the reduced ability to attract and retain the talent at all levels—from technicians to engineers to Ph.D.’s—needed to develop and sustain active U.S. participation in the domestic and global nuclear marketplace. In that vein, NEAC recommends that both university and industry programs in nuclear R&D be strengthened, and that laboratories and facilities in the DOE complex be modernized and made more efficient. These programs should be developed in consultation with relevant government agencies and scientists, DOE national laboratories, private industry, and the academic community.

#### U.S. commitment to pyro-processing restarts the nuclear industry

Stephen Berry & George S. Tolley, 11-29-2010, James Franck Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus at the University of Chicago, Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, foreign Member, Royal Danish Academy of Sciences, member and Home Secretary, National Academy of Sciences, J. Heyrovsky Honorary Medal for Merit in the Chemical Sciences, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung Senior Scientist Award, Phi Beta Kappa National Lecturer, George S. Tolley is a professor emeritus in Economics at the University of Chicago, fellow, American Association for the Advancement of Science, honorary editor, Resource and Energy Economics, honorary Ph.D., North Carolina State University, “Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Future Prospects and Viability,” p. 39, <http://humanities.uchicago.edu/orgs/institute/bigproblems/Team7-1210.pdf>

Increasing government support of advancements in reprocessing in the U.S. would encourage growth and investment in this technology. Therefore, continued government commitment to researching pyroprocessing and other advanced fuel cycle technologies is vital to the nuclear industry, especially if we envision this technology maturing internationally. As unsustainable as our current nuclear waste disposal strategies are, we believe in the current political climate, commercial reprocessing in the United States are not a viable option due to high environmental and technological costs, as well as having significant nuclear proliferation threats. However, in order for the U.S. to employ pyroprocessing in the future, the government must begin now to incentivize the technology for firms and investors. As uranium prices are expected to increase in the future, as well as an increasing concern regarding the management of nuclear waste worldwide, reprocessing may become a promising solution provided investments are made to address current challenges in the field.

#### Nuclear industry growth spurs talent transfer from developing countries – the link only goes one way: brain drain does not hurt developing countries industries

Jacques C. Hymans, January/March 2011, is associate professor of international relations at the University of Southern California, research focuses on nuclear proliferation, and more broadly, on international security affairs, an editorial board member of the Nonproliferation Review, Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University, Postdoctoral Fellow, Harvard University Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 20 Issue 1, “Proliferation Implications of Civil Nuclear Cooperation: Theory and a Case Study of Tito's Yugoslavia,” p. 79-80, Ebsco Host

One of the basic points made by the technology transfer literature, and whose importance for the case of nuclear proliferation has been stressed by Montgomery, is that the genuine diffusion of technical capacities is often quite limited. A first reason why is that supplier countries often do not or cannot transfer the crucial tacit knowledge that comes from hands-on expe-rience, and without which the technology’s potential will remain dormant. 24 The relevance of this point for nuclear proliferation has been shown by Liu Yanqiong and Liu Jifeng, whose detailed study of the 1950s Soviet assistance to China’s nuclear weapons project shows that because Soviet technicians were not very forthcoming with their knowledge, the assistance was not nearly as seminal as many have claimed. 25 A second reason why technology transfer is often less than meets the eye is that developing countries often lack sufficient “absorptive capacity”—for instance, their technical bureau-cracy may not be well-organized enough to learn to do anything more than run a turnkey facility. 26 A recent statistical analysis by Montgomery suggests 21 that this factor may be an important limitation on technology transfer in the nuclear weapons area as well. 27 But the technology transfer literature does not limit itself simply to identifying frictions, transaction costs, and other hindrances to the seamless operation of the “give-get” model. It has also stressed that international link-ages forged for the purpose of technology transfer actually create a decidedly two-way street. Beginning in the early 1970s, social scientists attached to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) developed the concept of “reverse transfer of technology.” 28 The clearest case of reverse transfer of technology can be seen in the serious and persistent “brain drain” of developing country scientists and other highly skilled workers to devel-oped countries. In other words, international technical “assistance” programs actually often morph into avenues for the poaching of developing country talent. The implication of these points for proliferation is that the greater the brain drain of nuclear scientific workers out of a developing country, the lower its nuclear weapons capacity becomes. Strangely, the proliferation literature has focused on brain drain only in its most sensationalist aspect—the possibility that a few former Soviet weapons scientists, for instance, might have gone to work for Kim Jong Il or Saddam Hussein. 29 But the brain drain’s most typical pattern is the movement of “brains” from developing countries, or more recently from the post-Soviet area, to the advanced industrialized states. And nuclear scientific workers are no exception to the rule.

#### Empirics prove: brain drain creates brain circulation

Jacques C. Hymans, January/March 2011, is associate professor of international relations at the University of Southern California, research focuses on nuclear proliferation, and more broadly, on international security affairs, an editorial board member of the Nonproliferation Review, Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University,Postdoctoral Fellow, Harvard University Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 20 Issue 1, “Proliferation Implications of Civil Nuclear Cooperation: Theory and a Case Study of Tito's Yugoslavia,” p. 100-3, Ebsco Host

Many analysts have characterized aboveboard international civil nuclear cooperation—“Atoms for Peace”—as an unmitigated disaster for the cause of nonproliferation. Most of Atoms for Peace’s dwindling band of supporters themselves no longer contest the idea that it has given dozens of developing countries the technical capacity to build nuclear weapons at a time of their 114 Note that despite Tito’s 1974 decision, Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova finds that Solingen’s argument about the impact of liberalizing political coalition interests on regimes’ nuclear intentions generally fits the Yugoslav case pretty well. See Mukhatzhanova, “Nuclear Weapons in the Balkans,” esp. 213–15. choosing. Even such routine practices as the holding of international confer-ences and student exchange programs in the fields of nuclear science and engineering have come under fire. In contrast to these general trends in the literature, this article has offered a more nuanced assessment of the effects of Atoms for Peace. The literature needs to abandon its outdated, oversimplified, techno-centric approach to the supply side of the proliferation equation. When we recognize that “tech-nical” capacity has political foundations, the effects of Atoms for Peace on states’ nuclear weapons capacity appear much different than the literature suggests. In particular, by changing the career opportunities available to the most talented and energetic among the small pool of competent scientific workers in developing country contexts, Atoms for Peace makes their choice for loyalty more complicated, their choice for voice less dangerous, and their choice for exit more feasible. Thus, Atoms for Peace can substantially retard or even reverse the growth of technical capacity to build the bomb, despite the transfer of hardware and know-how that it promotes. The case study of Yugoslavia has substantiated the theorized nonproliferation-promoting effects of Atoms for Peace, even during the pol-icy’s most “na¨ıve” nuclear promotion days of the 1950s and 1960s. As Yu-goslavia represents a hard test for the theory presented here, the findings from this study should be given special heed. We should not be surprised that Atoms for Peace ended up undercutting the Tito regime’s nuclear ambi-tions through such mechanisms as brain drain, since similar findings abound in the broader literature on international technology transfer, with which the proliferation literature needs to engage deeply. This article is not claiming that Atoms for Peace was a silver bullet for nonproliferation in the case of Yugoslavia. Rather, the claim is that over the long run Atoms for Peace intensified and locked in the Yugoslav nuclear program’s poor organizational performance, and accelerated the program’s ultimate collapse. Some readers might be tempted to conclude that since poor organization and management were the root causes of Yugoslavia’s nuclear woes, therefore the effects of Atoms for Peace were superfluous to the outcome. However, it would be wrong to ignore the Atoms for Peace variable simply because it did not singlehandedly prevent a Yugoslav nuclear bomb from coming into being. Recall that up until now, the literature has generally contended that Atoms for Peace helps states leapfrog over their or-ganizational and resource limitations by handing them ready-made solutions to difficult technical problems. So it would already be a significant finding simply to show that Atoms for Peace, even in its heyday in the 1950s and 1960s, actually did not allow them to leapfrog those limitations. But in fact my finding is that Atoms for Peace greatly compounded those limitations, at least in the case of Yugoslavia. My finding turns standard thinking about this question on its head. This finding is not just interestingly counterintu-itive; it also has important implications for United States and international nonproliferation policy. Typical nonproliferation measures, such as export controls and technical safeguards, can hope to achieve little more than to re-strain nuclear programs from moving forward; but I have shown that Atoms for Peace, especially by stimulating the brain drain, ultimately caused the Yu-goslav nuclear program to stumble backward, and made it next to impossible for Belgrade to turn things around. I should also underscore that this article is not claiming that Yugoslavia’s experience with Atoms for Peace necessarily generalizes to every developing country. Some developing countries have been able to leverage civil nuclear cooperation to achieve nuclear weapons more quickly than they otherwise could have. India is often mentioned as a prime example of the danger that Atoms for Peace will unwittingly provide atoms for war. But this article’s focus on Yugoslavia represents a necessary corrective to the literature’s typ-ical focus on proliferation headline-makers like India. Moreover, there are good theoretical reasons to think that the Yugoslav nuclear experience with Atoms for Peace may have been much more typical for developing countries than the Indian experience. First, as noted earlier in the article, the brain drain literature has singled out India as one of the handful of developing countries where the size and quality of the science and technology com-munity are enough to allow it to absorb the hit of a substantial brain drain and yet still benefit through such compensating mechanisms as brain circu-lation, brain diaspora, and brain replacement. 121 Second, the literature on state capacity suggests that the bureaucratic “steel frame” inherited from the British colonial Indian Civil Service, though surely not problem-free, places India far above most other developing countries in terms of its level of state institutionalization. 122 Reflecting these general bureaucratic strengths of the Indian state, the Indian nuclear program was—despite some hiccups—quite well-organized and managed, and this substantially reduced the potential for India’s participation in Atoms for Peace to cause it serious damage. 123 In short, India appears deductively to be a much more exceptional case in the developing world than Yugoslavia, although more in-depth case studies will be necessary before we can say for sure if Yugoslavia’s experience with Atoms for Peace was truly typical or not. 124 121 An anonymous reviewer of this article suggested that we should consider whether, contrary to the general presumption of the proliferation literature, proliferant states often pare back their international civil nuclear cooperation efforts in order to avoid creating complications for their nuclear weapons Proliferation Implications of Civil Nuclear Cooperation 103 It might be that even if Yugoslavia’s experience was typical for its time period, a reenergized Atoms for Peace policy would not have the same nonproliferation-promoting consequences in today’s changed circumstances. But it is also possible to argue that an expanded commitment to overt interna-tional civil nuclear cooperation would have even stronger nonproliferation-promoting consequences in today’s world. After all, the brain drain from the developing world (and post-Communist states) continues to be a major social fact in the contemporary international system. Although the United States demand for the services of developing-world scientists and engineers was already quite high during the 1950s and 1960s, it has become absolutely voracious in recent years. Between 1978 and 2008, the number of U.S. PhD recipients holding temporary visas jumped from 3,475 (11 percent of the total number of doctorates granted by American universities) to 15,246 (31 percent of the total). In the physical sciences, the increase was from 653 (16 percent) to 3,678 (45 percent). In engineering, the increase was from 781 (32 percent) to 4,486 (57 percent). Of these newly minted temporary visa-holding PhDs, in 2008 73.5 percent reported the intention to remain in the United States; this number was generally much higher among those PhDs who had come from developing and post-Communist countries. Meanwhile, the out-migration of the highly skilled is having dramatic consequences on the resource base of sending countries: for instance, 41 percent of all tertiary-educated Caribbeans have emigrated to developed countries; for West Africa the figure is 27 percent; and for East Africa it is 18.4 percent. 125 This mas-sive brain drain is nothing to celebrate; it has caused major social ills in the developing world. But as an empirical matter brain drain is correlated with reduced technological potential, and when it comes to the narrow question of nuclear weapons development, reducing developing countries’ techno-logical potential is not necessarily a bad thing. One could try to turn this argument around and contend that since the brain drain has become so massive, state policies can do little to encourage or discourage it anymore. But in fact the brain drain still depends crucially on facilitative state policies, especially those of the United States and other receiving countries. 126 In the nuclear area in particular, there is no guarantee that those facilitative policies will continue. As noted at the outset of this article, nonproliferation concerns have led the United States to reduce sub-stantially the scope of its international civil nuclear cooperation programs over the past decades, and some nonproliferation advocates want to abolish them altogether.

#### The plan allows high skilled immigrants to vote with their feet, which ends repressive regimes abroad and at home

Ilya Somin, Professor of Law at George Mason University, 2008 (George Mason University School of Law, 73 Mo. L. Rev. 1247 Fall

From the standpoint of promoting foot voting, the distinction between victims of "persecution" and other potential migrants makes little sense. Even potential migrants who have not been personally targeted for persecution on the basis of race, religion or political beliefs may still suffer the ill effects of oppressive or misguided government policies. For example, repression of the right to freedom of speech and political organization affects not only would-be speakers, but also all other citizens of the society in question, who are forced to live under a political process that they have no power to influence. Similarly, "economic" migrants are in many cases fleeing poverty that is in large part caused by the flawed policies of the governments they live under. Development economists recognize that most poor countries could generate rapid economic growth by adopting appropriate policies. n51 In many  [\*1262]  cases, enormous advances in the economic status of the poor could be achieved simply by allowing them to acquire enforceable property rights n52 and by integrating the nation in question more closely with the world economy. n53 All too often, migrants who are fleeing generally adverse economic and political conditions are no less victims of their governments than those who have been targeted for individualized "persecution" of the sort currently recognized as grounds for asylum rights by international law .. Previous scholars have argued for stronger international migration rights on a variety of grounds. n54 This Article highlights an additional and generally ignored advantage of migration rights: the opportunity to strengthen democratic accountability by enabling more people to "vote with their feet" against repressive or dysfunctional governments in their home societies. As in the case of domestic federal systems, international foot voting allows citizens greater choice over the government policies they live under, and may force states to adopt better policies in order to prevent skilled migrants and valuable taxpayers from departing. Unlike many other types of international law, a right to free migration does not significantly undermine the ability of democratic states to adopt diverse approaches to various policy issues. n55 States with free entry and exit rights can still enact a wide range of different policies, so long as they do not inhibit freedom of movement. Indeed, as scholars of domestic federalism have emphasized, freedom of movement might stimulate policy innovation by governments, as they compete for economically valuable migrants. n56  [\*1263]

#### Globalization has produced a politics of diasporic identity. Circulation challenges state nationalism and produces interdependence and empowerment – challenges status quo economic hierarchies.

Chandler Professor of Law, 01

Anupam Chander\*, Professor of Law, University of California at Davis,Chandler, Presentation at the Stanford Yale Junior Faculty Forum, held in 2001, 76 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1005 October 2001 Lexis

In a world that is increasingly diasporan, full of crisscrossing loyalties, transborder mobility, multinational political states, and transnational communities, neither the statist nor the cosmopolitan paradigm fits. n229 Diasporas require a reconceptualization of the nation-state and the international system. They challenge both the Westphalian cartography of territorially defined sovereigns and the cosmopolitan utopia of a united mankind. The diaspora model begins with the recognition that diasporas exemplify the contemporary condition. Corporations too have become increasingly multinational, with their ownership and operations dispersed through the world. n230 Labor and capital, seeking their highest  [\*1049]  valued use, move with fewer legal and technological barriers across states. Additionally, information has become widely disseminated, its passage sped through the Internet, resulting in the creation of virtual transnational communities. n231 The hallmarks of a globalized world are hybridity, intermingling, and multiple allegiances. But despite this intermingling, most people have not sloughed off their nationalist skin in favor of an evolved cosmopolitanism. Rather, the hybridity resulting from globalization often manifests itself in individuals who subscribe to multiple nationalisms [n232](http://www.lexisnexis.com.floyd.lib.umn.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1296151495155&returnToKey=20_T11102761817&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.144948.34542102285" \l "n232) or a transnationalism. Multiple nationalisms and transnationalism become possible because "the nationalist genie, never perfectly contained in the bottle of the territorial state, is now itself diasporic." n233 The diaspora model does not seek to dismantle the nation-state, but rather to rearticulate it as a multinational state permitting the voluntary transnational associations of its people. Furthermore, the model seeks to enfranchise diasporas as recognized legal subjects in the transnational legal process. n234 The lived experience of diasporas demonstrates the possibility of negotiating such divided feelings in a way that allows diasporas to contribute to their homelands and adopted lands simultaneously. n235 Moreover, it demonstrates the possibility of a transnational community built on individual voluntary commitments. Increasingly, we see the emergence of a transnational civic republicanism, with the diaspora taking an active part in shaping the future direction of its homeland. A globalized world requires a new paradigm of the relationship of the citizen to the state. The diaspora model proposes that we view that relationship as complicated and dynamic. The model would permit individuals to construct national and transnational communities of their own choosing. In this way, then, the diaspora model rejects the unitary ideology of statism in favor of an understanding of the state that respects the possibility of plural commitments and loyalties. And instead of requiring us to refashion ourselves, first and foremost, as world citizens, the diaspora model offers an internationalism that respects  [\*1050]  patriotic feelings and individual attachments to country and community - with the hope that such attachments might bind the world closer together. Thus, the diaspora model complicates the international system, replacing the clean demarcations of statism with an acceptance of overlapping sovereignties. n236 As the communitarian philosopher Michael Sandel observes, "the most promising alternative to the sovereign state is not a cosmopolitan community based on the solidarity of humankind but a multiplicity of communities and political bodies - some more extensive than nations and some less - among which sovereignty is diffused." n237 This approach does not mean doing away with states, but rather denying their claim to the exclusive allegiance of their residents. The diaspora model thus offers an intermediate point between the exclusivity of statism and the universality of cosmopolitanism. With some optimism, the model locates in diasporas the possibility of building bridges across the world, between rich and poor countries and between liberal and illiberal societies. Diasporas offer the possibility of uniting the world through a web of personal and community loyalties, while international capital flows and international trade create a web of international economic dependencies. This web of personal loyalties is spun through the dual loyalties of individuals in diaspora. The relationship of individual to state, conceived by Westphalians as a one-to-one relationship and by cosmopolitans as ethically irrelevant, can be reimagined to promote both the ideal of authenticity and the possibility of economic development.

#### Diasporic politics break down xenophobic us/them politics, it decreases conflict Chandler Professor of Law, 01

Anupam Chander\*, Professor of Law, University of California at Davis,Chandler, Presentation at the Stanford Yale Junior Faculty Forum, held in 2001, 76 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1005 October 2001 Lexis

Finally, the intermingling of the people of the world … may well include our neighbors and friends. In a world characterized by ever-increasing globalization, not only of capital and goods but also of people, diasporas seek a link to a past that is removed not only in time but also in space. n465 At times, this link can manifest itself in an atavistic racialism. Diaspora Bonds, on the other hand, demonstrate one possibility where this link to the past may be put in the service of economic development in the present. People sustaining diaspora ties must do so critically, eschewing moral relativism yet respecting difference. In accordance with this critical project, we might ask: Why introduce diaspora as another category of individual identity relevant to the law?  [\*1096]  In a globalized world, mutation, hybridity, and intermixture represent the prevailing norm. Thus, the diaspora model, which allows people to maintain hybridized and hybridizing bonds to homeland and hostland, better approximates how people now imagine their relationship to the state than either the statist or cosmopolitan models. Moreover, while it rejects the statist demand that all persons pledge fealty to one state or the cosmopolitan desire that we forswear any primary fealty to country, the diaspora model is broad enough to accommodate persons who register support only for one state or for no state at all. Rather than seeking to change people, the diaspora model suggests that we revisit our conception of the international order. By recognizing the possibility of a wide array of allegiances, especially to homeland and transnational community, the diaspora model promotes authenticity and allows people to flourish. Second, the diaspora model offers a view of citizenship that reconciles globalization with the desire for a sense of rootedness. It understands the traveling nature of contemporary culture. [n466](http://www.lexisnexis.com.floyd.lib.umn.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1296151495155&returnToKey=20_T11102761817&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.144948.34542102285" \l "n466) The diaspora approach embraces globalization, but does not mistake it for a renunciation of nation or state. The diaspora model embraces the multiculturalism of cosmopolitanism while still respecting the very thing that animates such multiculturalism - the individual's search for belonging. Third, accepting diaspora as a legitimate basis for community affirms a connection between rich and poor nations that can support economic development. We find exactly this dynamic in the case of Diaspora Bonds, which enable homeland governments to tap the wealth of their expatriates to fund economic development in the homeland. [n467](http://www.lexisnexis.com.floyd.lib.umn.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1296151495155&returnToKey=20_T11102761817&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.144948.34542102285" \l "n467) Admittedly, cosmopolitanism offers a distributive justice approach [n468](http://www.lexisnexis.com.floyd.lib.umn.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1296151495155&returnToKey=20_T11102761817&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.144948.34542102285" \l "n468) that is more demanding and systematic than the voluntary homeland-regarding actions of the diaspora. However, the diaspora model is more likely to harness existing forces for economic development than cosmopolitanism is likely to find the altruistic, enlightened persons who embrace its nondiscriminatory principles. [n469](http://www.lexisnexis.com.floyd.lib.umn.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1296151495155&returnToKey=20_T11102761817&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.144948.34542102285" \l "n469) Fourth, recognizing diasporan relationships allows us to better understand the contemporary world order. It allows us to grasp the connections between distant events and to place these events into a broader global framework. Recognizing the diaspora helps locate individual  [\*1097]  events in a broader narrative. [n470](http://www.lexisnexis.com.floyd.lib.umn.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1296151495155&returnToKey=20_T11102761817&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.144948.34542102285" \l "n470) Of course, we must still bear in mind that diasporan events will differ from each other in important ways. Finally, the intermingling of the people of the world across states and nations may reduce interstate violence and human rights abuse. Diasporas blur the distinction between "us" and "them." It will be harder to demonize another people when one's own compatriots hail from that same place and maintain strong bonds to it. Because diasporas muddy the purity of nations, they offer a possible escape from what Samuel Huntington describes as a post-Cold War "clash of civilizations." n471 While it would be Panglossian to suggest that the diaspora's adopted land will be unlikely to declare war on the diaspora's home country or vice versa, [n472](http://www.lexisnexis.com.floyd.lib.umn.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1296151495155&returnToKey=20_T11102761817&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.144948.34542102285" \l "n472) it may be the case that the diaspora will help the two countries understand each other better, thereby potentially reducing the likelihood of hostilities. Additionally, should war in fact break out, it would be more likely targeted at the foreign government, not its people, since its people may well include our neighbors and friends.

### Plan

Plan: The United States Federal Government should substantially increase commercial loan guarantees for purposes of energy production by development for Integral Fast Reactors in the United States.

### Solvency

#### Loan guarantees are key to establishing pyro-processing.

Stephen Berry & George S. Tolley, 11-29-2010, James Franck Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus at the University of Chicago, Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, foreign Member, Royal Danish Academy of Sciences, member and Home Secretary, National Academy of Sciences, J. Heyrovsky Honorary Medal for Merit in the Chemical Sciences, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung Senior Scientist Award, Phi Beta Kappa National Lecturer, George S. Tolley is a professor emeritus in Economics at the University of Chicago, fellow, American Association for the Advancement of Science, honorary editor, Resource and Energy Economics, honorary Ph.D., North Carolina State University, “Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Future Prospects and Viability,” p. 38, <http://humanities.uchicago.edu/orgs/institute/bigproblems/Team7-1210.pdf>

The construction of an aqueous solvent extraction plant would be out of date, especially when the more promising option of pyroprocessing is on the horizon. In comparison, to current available methods, pyroprocessing produces virtually no waste, can be done on-site, and offers the option of fabricating proliferation resistant fuel from plutonium as well as uranium. The second question in regard to domestic reprocessing is, “how much direct involvement should the government have in the reprocessing business?” Government involvement could be justified on the grounds of the externalities present in nuclear waste disposal. This could take on a variety of forms - government research efforts, subsidizing reprocessing (or offering tax credits and loan guarantees), or even operating a reprocessing center on its own. Through its actions, the government will be able to influence the development and growth of the nuclear reprocessing industry in the United States. These efforts in support of pyroprocessing and other advanced fuel cycle technologies represent a small portion of the Department of Energy budget - only $142,652,000 out of a total of $33,856,453,000 in discretionary funding in FY 2009, or less than half of one percent98. Furthermore, private companies do not have sufficient independent incentives to reduce the long-term health and environmental consequences of nuclear waste disposal. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to present a formal costbenefit analysis of R&D efforts, given the minimal costs and the large potential benefits, the chances of success do not need to be very high to justify continued government expenditures in this area.

#### U.S. commitment to pyro-processing sustains the nuclear industry – prices and management.

Stephen Berry & George S. Tolley, 11-29-2010, James Franck Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus at the University of Chicago, Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, foreign Member, Royal Danish Academy of Sciences, member and Home Secretary, National Academy of Sciences, J. Heyrovsky Honorary Medal for Merit in the Chemical Sciences, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung Senior Scientist Award, Phi Beta Kappa National Lecturer, George S. Tolley is a professor emeritus in Economics at the University of Chicago, fellow, American Association for the Advancement of Science, honorary editor, Resource and Energy Economics, honorary Ph.D., North Carolina State University, “Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Future Prospects and Viability,” p. 39, <http://humanities.uchicago.edu/orgs/institute/bigproblems/Team7-1210.pdf>

Increasing government support of advancements in reprocessing in the U.S. would encourage growth and investment in this technology. Therefore, continued government commitment to researching pyroprocessing and other advanced fuel cycle technologies is vital to the nuclear industry, especially if we envision this technology maturing internationally. As unsustainable as our current nuclear waste disposal strategies are, we believe in the current political climate, commercial reprocessing in the United States are not a viable option due to high environmental and technological costs, as well as having significant nuclear proliferation threats. However, in order for the U.S. to employ pyroprocessing in the future, the government must begin now to incentivize the technology for firms and investors. As uranium prices are expected to increase in the future, as well as an increasing concern regarding the management of nuclear waste worldwide, reprocessing may become a promising solution provided investments are made to address current challenges in the field.

#### Fast reactors are 100% safe – multiple redundancies eliminating human error and impregnable\*\*

Barry Brook et. al, 2-21-2009, a leading environmental scientist, holding the Sir Hubert Wilkins Chair of Climate Change at the School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, and is also Director of Climate Science at the University of Adelaide’s Environment Institute, published three books, over 200 refereed scientific papers, is a highly cited researcher, received a number of distinguished awards for his research excellence including the Australian Academy of Science Fenner Medal, is an International Award Committee member for the Global Energy Prize, Australian Research Council Future Fellow, ISI Researcher, Ph.D., Macquarie University in Environmental Engineering, Science Council for Global Initiatives, Edgeworth David Medal Royal Society of NSW, Cosmos Bright Sparks Award, Tom Blees is the author of Prescription for the Planet, the president of the Science Council for Global Initiatives, member of the selection committee for the Global Energy Prize, George S. Stanford is a nuclear reactor physicist, part of the team that developed the Integral Fast Reactor, PhD from Stanford University in Physics, Masters from University of Virginia in Engineering, worked at Argonne National Laboratory, Graham R.L. Cowan, "Boron: A Better Energy Carrier than Hydrogen?" in 2001, published "How Fire Can Be Tamed," BraveNewClimate, “Response to an Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) critique,” <http://bravenewclimate.com/2009/02/21/response-to-an-integral-fast-reactor-ifr-critique/>

[BWB] The laws of physics say that this is not nonsense. For instance, the metal fuel pins’ composition is such that if they begin to overheat, the resulting expansion decreases their density to the point where the fission reaction simply shuts down. This is not speculation — it’s been tested and verified. I quote: “The IFR gains safety advantages through a combination of metal fuel (an alloy of uranium, plutonium, and zirconium), and sodium cooling. By providing a fuel which readily conducts heat from the fuel to the coolant, and which operates at relatively low temperatures, the IFR takes maximum advantage of expansion of the coolant, fuel, and structure during off-normal events which increase temperatures. The expansion of the fuel and structure in an off-normal situation causes the system to shut down even without human operator intervention. In April of 1986, two special tests were performed on the Experimental Breeder Reactor II (EBR-II), in which the main primary cooling pumps were shut off with the reactor at full power (62.5 Megawatts, thermal) – By not allowing the normal shutdown systems to interfere, the reactor power dropped to near zero within about 300 seconds. No damage to the fuel or the reactor resulted. This test demonstrated that even with a loss of all electrical power and the capability to shut down the reactor using the normal systems, the reactor will simply shut down without danger or damage. The same day, this demonstration was followed by another important test. With the reactor again at full power, flow in the secondary cooling system was stopped. This test caused the temperature to increase, since there was nowhere for the reactor heat to go. As the primary (reactor) cooling system became hotter, the fuel, sodium coolant, and structure expanded, and the reactor shut down. This test showed that an IFR type reactor will shut down using inherent features such as thermal expansion, even if the ability to remove heat from the primary cooling system is lost. Events such as the loss of water to the steam system would cause a condition such as the test demonstrated. Another major feature of the IFR concept is that the reactor uses a coolant, sodium, which does not boil during normal operation nor even in overpower transients such as described above. This means that the coolant is not under significant pressure. When coolant is not under pressure, the reactor can be placed in a “pool” of coolant, contained in a double tank, so that there is no real possibility for a loss of coolant. Even if the normal pumps are lost, some coolant flow through the reactor occurs due to natural convection. The features described above allow for greater simplification of a nuclear plant, resulting in cost savings, greater ease in operation, and a safety system that relies on natural phenomenon that cannot be defeated by human error. “ [TB] Arguing that these reactors cannot be safe from meltdowns flies in the face of the laws of physics, which assure that very feature. Regarding terrorist attack, we can secure our airports chemical plants, etc, with not a lot of work, you can design these plants to be virtually impregnable by terrorists (e.g., burying the reactor building). The new Gen III LWRs, though, are so far advanced as to merit their designation as a different generation. The probabilistic risk assessment of the ESBWR is astronomical, one core melt accident every 29 million reactor-years. Since we don’t have enough nuclear waste to load new IFRs quickly enough to meet the 2050 goal of zero emissions, the newest LWRs could be built to fill any gap that renewables and IFRs couldn’t fill and can be expected to perform safely. Their safety features are far beyond our current reactors by orders of magnitude.

#### Ontology focus at the expense of action causes paralysis

McClean 2001 David McClean (philosopher, writer and business consultant, conducted graduate work in philosophy at NYU) 2001 “The cultural left and the limits of social hope” http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm

There is a lot of philosophical prose on the general subject of social justice. Some of this is quite good, and some of it is quite bad. What distinguishes the good from the bad is not merely the level of erudition. Displays of high erudition are gratuitously reflected in much of the writing by those, for example, still clinging to Marxian ontology and is often just a useful smokescreen which shrouds a near total disconnect from empirical reality. This kind of political writing likes to make a lot of references to other obscure, jargon-laden essays and tedious books written by other true believers - the crowd that takes the fusion of Marxian and Freudian private fantasies seriously. Nor is it the lack of scholarship that makes this prose bad. Much of it is well "supported" by footnotes referencing a lode of other works, some of which are actually quite good. Rather, what makes this prose bad is its utter lack of relevance to extant and critical policy debates, the passage of actual laws, and the amendment of existing regulations that might actually do some good for someone else. The writers of this bad prose are too interested in our arrival at some social place wherein we will finally emerge from our "inauthentic" state into something called "reality." Most of this stuff, of course, comes from those steeped in the Continental tradition (particularly post-Kant). While that tradition has much to offer and has helped shape my own philosophical sensibilities, it is anything but useful when it comes to truly relevant philosophical analysis, and no self-respecting Pragmatist can really take seriously the strong poetry of formations like "authenticity looming on the ever remote horizons of fetishization." What Pragmatists see instead is the hope that we can fix some of the social ills that face us if we treat policy and reform as more important than Spirit and Utopia.

#### No root cause of war – decades of research votes aff

Cashman 2000 (Greg Cashman, Professor of Political Science at Salisbury State University, 2000 “What Causes war?: An introduction to theories of international conflict” pg. 9)

Two warnings need to be issued at this point. First, while we have been using a single variable explanation of war merely for the sake of simplicity, multivariate explanations of war are likely to be much more powerful. Since social and political behaviors are extremely complex, they are almost never explainable through a single factor. Decades of research have led most analysts to reject monocausal explanations of war. For instance, international relations theorist J. David Singer suggests that we ought to move away from the concept of “causality” since it has become associated with the search for a single cause of war; we should instead redirect our activities toward discovering “explanations”—a term that implies multiple causes of war, but also a certain element of randomness or chance in their occurrence.

#### Extinction outweighs – as long as there is some life there’s only a risk they retain ontological capacity

Hans Jonas (Former Alvin Johnson Prof. Phil. – New School for Social Research and Former Eric Voegelin Visiting Prof. – U. Munich) 1996 “Morality and Mortality: A Search for the Good After Auschwitz”, p. 111-112)

With this look ahead at an ethics for the future, we are touching at the same time upon the question of the future of freedom. The unavoidable discussion of this question seems to give rise to misunderstandings. My dire prognosis that not only our material standard of living but also our democratic freedoms would fall victim to the growing pressure of a worldwide ecological crisis, until finally there would remain only some form of tyranny that would try to save the situation, has led to the accusation that I am defending dictatorship as a solution to our problems. I shall ignore here what is a confusion between warning and recommendation. But I have indeed said that such a tyranny would still be better than total ruin; thus, I have ethically accepted it as an alternative. I must now defend this standpoint, which I continue to support, before the court that I myself have created with the main argument of this essay. For are we not contradicting ourselves in prizing physical survival at the price of freedom? Did we not say that freedom was the condition of our capacity for responsibility—and that this capacity was a reason for the survival of humankind?; By tolerating tyranny as an alternative to physical annihilation are we not violating the principle we established: that the How of existence must not take precedence over its Why? Yet we can make a terrible concession to the primacy of physical survival in the conviction that the ontological capacity for freedom, inseparable as it is from man's being, cannot really be extinguished, only temporarily banished from the public realm. This conviction can be supported by experience we are all familiar with. We have seen that even in the most totalitarian societies the urge for freedom on the part of some individuals cannot be extinguished, and this renews our faith in human beings. Given this faith, we have reason to hope that, as long as there are human beings who survive, the image of God will continue to exist along with them and will wait in concealment for its new hour. With that hope—which in this particular case takes precedence over fear—it is permissible, for the sake of physical survival, to accept if need be a temporary absence of freedom in the external affairs of humanity. This is, I want to emphasize, a worst-case scenario, and it is the foremost task of responsibility at this particular moment in world history to prevent it from happening. This is in fact one of the noblest of duties (and at the same time one concerning self-preservation), on the part of the imperative of responsibility to avert future coercion that would lead to lack of freedom by acting freely in the present, thus preserving as much as possible the ability of future generations to assume responsibility. But more than that is involved. At stake is the preservation of Earth's entire miracle of creation, of which our human existence is a part and before which man reverently bows, even without philosophical "grounding." Here too faith may precede and reason follow; it is faith that longs for this preservation of the Earth (fides quaerens intellectum), and reason comes as best it can to faith's aid with arguments, not knowing or even asking how much depends on its success or failure in determining what action to take. With this confession of faith we come to the end of our essay on ontology.

#### Death is the ultimate form of ontological destruction – its destroys all human possibility – reject it regardless of their value to life arguments

Craig Paterson (Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island) 2003 “A Life Not Worth Living?”,Studies in Christian Ethics, http://sce.sagepub.com

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alternative of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes. 80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life. 81 In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility

#### Vote aff to preserve the capacity of individuals to choose

Craig Paterson (Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island) 2003 “A Life Not Worth Living?”,Studies in Christian Ethics, http://sce.sagepub.com

In determining whether a life is worth living or not, attention should be focused upon an array of ‘interests’ of the person, and these, for the competent patient at least, are going to vary considerably, since they will be informed by the patient’s underlying dispositions, and, for the incompetent, by a minimal quality threshold. It follows that for competent patients, a broad-ranging assessment of quality of life concerns is the trump card as to whether or not life continues to be worthwhile. Different patients may well decide differently. That is the prerogative of the patient, for the only unpalatable alternative is to force a patient to stay alive. For Harris, life can be judged valuable or not when the person assessing his or her own life determines it to be so. If a person values his or her own life, then that life is valuable, precisely to the extent that he or she values it. Without any real capacity to value, there can be no value. As Harris states, ‘. . . the value of our lives is the value we give to our lives’. It follows that the primary injustice done to a person is to deprive the person of a life he or she may think valuable. Objectivity in the value of human life, for Harris, essentially becomes one of negative classification (ruling certain people out of consideration for value), allied positively to a broad range of ‘critical interests’; interests worthy of pursuing — friendships, family, life goals, etc. — which are subjected to de facto self-assessment for the further determination of meaningful value. Suicide, assisted suicide, and voluntary euthanasia, can therefore be justified, on the grounds that once the competent nature of the person making the decision has been established, the thoroughgoing commensuration between different values, in the form of interests or preferences, is essentially left up to the individual to determine for himself or herself.

#### Calculation is good and doesn’t devalue life

Revesz 2008 Richard L. Revesz (Dean and Lawrence King Professor of Law at New York University School of Law, JD Yale Law School) and Michael A Livermore. (JD NYU School of Law, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Integrity, and Managing director of the NYU Law Review). Retaking Rationality How Cots-Benefit Analysis Can Better protect the Environment and Our Health. 2008. P. 1-4.

Governmental decisions are also fundamentally different from personal decisions in that they often affect people in the aggregate. In our individual lives, we come into contact with at least some of the consequences of our decisions. If we fail to consult a map, we pay the price: losing valuable time driving around in circles and listening to the complaints of our passengers. We are constantly confronted with the consequences of the choices that we have made. Not so for governments, however, which exercise authority by making decisions at a distance. Perhaps one of the most challenging aspects of governmental decisions is that they require a special kind of compassion—one that can seem, at first glance, cold and calculating, the antithesis of empathy. The aggregate and complex nature of governmental decisions does not address people as human beings, with concerns and interests, families and emotional relationships, secrets and sorrows. Rather, people are numbers stacked in a column or points on a graph, described not through their individual stories of triumph and despair, but by equations, functions, and dose-response curves. The language of governmental decisionmaking can seem to—and to a certain extent does—ignore what makes individuals unique and morally important. But, although the language of bureaucratic decisionmaking can be dehumanizing, it is also a prerequisite for the kind of compassion that is needed in contemporary society. Elaine Scarry has developed a comparison between individual compassion and statistical compassion.' Individual compassion is familiar—when we see a person suffering, or hear the story of some terrible tragedy, we are moved to take action. Statistical compassion seems foreign—we hear only a string of numbers but must comprehend "the concrete realities embedded there."' Individual compassion derives from our social nature, and may be hardwired directly into the human brain.' Statistical compassion calls on us to use our higher reasoning power to extend our natural compassion to the task of solving more abstract—but no less real—problems. Because compassion is not just about making us feel better—which we could do as easily by forgetting about a problem as by addressing it—we have a responsibility to make the best decisions that we can. This book argues that cost-benefit analysis, properly conducted, can improve environmental and public health policy. Cost-benefit analysis—the translation of human lives and acres of forest into the language of dollars and cents—can seem harsh and impersonal. But such an approach is also necessary to improve the quality of decisions that regulators make. Saving the most lives, and best protecting the quality of our environment and our health—in short, exercising our compassion most effectively—requires us to step back and use our best analytic tools. Sometimes, in order to save a life, we need to treat a person like a number. This is the challenge of statistical compassion. This book is about making good decisions. It focuses on the area of environmental, health and safety regulation. These regulations have been the source of numerous and hard-fought controversies over the past several decades, particularly at the federal level. Reaching the right decisions in the areas of environmental protection, increasing safety, and improving public health is clearly of high importance. Although it is admirable (and fashionable) for people to buy green or avoid products made in sweatshops, efforts taken at the individual level are not enough to address the pressing problems we face—there is a vital role for government in tackling these issues, and sound collective decisions concerning regulation are needed. There is a temptation to rely on gut-level decisionmaking in order to avoid economic analysis, which, to many, is a foreign language on top of seeming cold and unsympathetic. For government to make good decisions, however, it cannot abandon reasoned analysis. Because of the complex nature of governmental decisions, we have no choice but to deploy complex analytic tools in order to make the best choices possible. Failing to use these tools, which amounts to abandoning our duties to one another, is not a legitimate response. Rather, we must exercise statistical compassion by recognizing what numbers of lives saved represent: living and breathing human beings, unique, with rich inner lives and an interlocking web of emotional relationships. The acres of a forest can be tallied up in a chart, but that should not blind us to the beauty of a single stand of trees. We need to use complex tools to make good decisions while simultaneously remembering that we are not engaging in abstract exercises, but that we are having real effects on people and the environment. In our personal lives, it would be unwise not to shop around for the best price when making a major purchase, or to fail to think through our options when making a major life decision. It is equally foolish for government to fail to fully examine alternative policies when making regulatory decisions with life-or-death consequences. This reality has been recognized by four successive presidential administrations. Since 1981, the cost-benefit analysis of major regulations has been required by presidential order. Over the past twenty-five years, however, environmental and other progressive groups have declined to participate in the key governmental proceedings concerning the cost-benefit analysis of federal regulations, instead preferring to criticize the technique from the outside. The resulting asymmetry in political participation has had profound negative consequences, both for the state of federal regulation and for the technique of cost-benefit analysis itself. Ironically, this state of affairs has left progressives open to the charge of rejecting reason, when in fact strong environmental and public health pro-grams are often justified by cost-benefit analysis. It is time for progressive groups, as well as ordinary citizens, to retake the high ground by embracing and reforming cost-benefit analysis. The difference between being unthinking—failing to use the best tools to analyze policy—and unfeeling—making decisions without compassion—is unimportant: Both lead to bad policy. Calamities can result from the failure to use either emotion or reason. Our emotions provide us with the grounding for our principles, our innate interconnectedness, and our sense of obligation to others. We use our powers of reason to build on that emotional foundation, and act effectively to bring about a better world.

#### Uranium mining is a well-documented form of nuclear colonialism – Pyro-processing solves

Danielle Endres, November 2009, research and teaching interests lie in argumentation, rhetorical criticism, environmental communication, social movements, and Native American cultures, directing an oral history project: Nuclear Technology in the American West that is collecting and archiving the stories of people involved in nuclear issues, particularly nuclear waste, in the American West. Third, Danielle is a co-director of a national research project on climate change activism, “From wasteland to waste site: the role of discourse in nuclear power’s environmental injustices,” Local Environment, Ebsco Host

As mentioned above, nuclear colonialism describes how the nuclear production process – including both nuclear weapons production and nuclear power – disproportionately harms indigenous people worldwide.3 The Indigenous Environmental Network (2002) wrote: The nuclear industry has waged an undeclared war against our Indigenous peoples and Pacific Islanders that has poisoned our communities worldwide. For more than 50 years, the legacy of the nuclear chain, from exploration to the dumping of radioactive waste has been proven, through documentation, to be genocide and ethnocide and a deadly enemy of Indigenous peoples. . . United States federal law and nuclear policy has not protected Indigenous peoples, and in fact has been created to allow the nuclear industry to continue operations at the expense of our land, territory, health and traditional ways of life. . . . This disproportionate toxic burden – called environmental racism – has culminated in the current attempts to dump much of the nation’s nuclear waste in the homelands of the Indigenous peoples of the Great Basin region of the United States. Examples of nuclear colonialism in the United States include Uranium mining and milling on reservation lands in the Black Hills and Four Corners regions, nuclear testing on land claimed under the 1863 Treaty of Ruby Valley by theWestern Shoshone, and HLWstorage sites considered on Western Shoshone, Southern Paiute, and Skull Valley Band of Goshute lands (Nelkin 1981, Grinde and Johansen 1995, Kuletz 1998, La Duke 1999, Hoffman 2001). The phenomenon of nuclear colonialism is empirically documented. The book Nuclear Wastelands, edited by Makhijani et al. (1995), reveals that indigenous people in the USA and globally are disproportionately burdened by the production of nuclear weapons. Further, Hooks and Smith (2004, p. 572) demonstrate that US military sites are disproportionately located on or near Native American lands. While these studies focus primarily on military applications of nuclear technologies, there is also evidence to suggest that Uranium mining for nuclear power production and HLW storage also fall within the pattern of nuclear colonialism (Nelkin 1981, Hoffman 2001). Hoffman (2001, p. 462) details the “extraordinary unequal distribution of benefits and burdens at each stage of the [nuclear fuel] cycle” imposed upon Native American nations in the USA, particularly by Uranium mining and HLW disposal. Nuclear colonialism is a type of environmental injustice. In part, nuclear colonialism is environmental racism. According to Bullard (1999, p. 6), “environmental racism combines with public policies and industry practices to provide benefits for whites while shifting costs to people of color”. Yet, nuclear colonialism is also a form of colonialism. Native Americans, unlike other marginalised racial groups in the USA, are members of over 150 distinct sovereign tribal nations and each holds a unique legal relationship with the federal government. As Suagee (2002, p. 227) notes, “Although Indian people have suffered much discriminatory treatment from people who apparently define Indian identity in primarily racial–ethnic terms, the fact that Native American governments are sovereign governments is a significant distinction between them and other kinds of minorities”. Although Native Americans in the USA are sovereign governments, they are still faced with a system of colonialism. Gedicks (1993, p. 13) argues that Native Americans are embedded within a system of resource colonialism under which “native peoples are under assault on every continent because their lands contain a wide variety of valuable resources needed for industrial development”. Nuclear colonialism is a form of resource colonialism that faces Native Americans in the USA and other indigenous peoples worldwide.4

#### Nuclear energy is essential to quality of life issues that disproportionately affect minority communities. Public transportation, water treatment, hospitals, .

American Association of Blacks in Energy 2002 May, 1 pg. 1 “American Association of Blacks in Energy Supports Yucca Mountain Storage Repository” <http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/nuclearwastedisposal/regulatoryinformation/aabenewsrelease5102 >

At its quarterly meeting last month, the Board of Directors of the American Association of Blacks in Energy announced its support for Congressional ratification of Yucca Mountain, Nevada as the logical site for nuclear waste storage. “Careful and diligent monitoring is key to ensuring public health and safety, but that can be better accomplished at one site instead of continuing the current practice of on-site storage. The Yucca Mountain project is an important component in a solid energy policy which ensures energy and environmental equity for all Americans,” said Frank Johnson, chairman of the association. In related action, the organization reaffirmed its support for re-licensing of nuclear facilities. “Nuclear is America’s largest base-load, emission-free electricity. Minority communities are commonly found in urban areas that require large amounts of electricity for public transportation, hospitals, water treatment facilities and other necessities. We believe that nuclear energy provides important benefits”, said Johnson. “Our quality of life depends upon electricity that is reliable and affordable – and nuclear is an important part of the mix,” he said. AABE is a national association of energy professionals founded and dedicated to ensure the input of African Americans and other minorities into the discussion and development of energy policies, regulations, R&D technologies and environmental issues.

#### You should adopt an ontology of pragmatism- we must work with the system that we are handed and cannot simply wish it away

HNSG (Harvard Nuclear Study Group – Albert Carnesale, UCLA Chancellor Emeritus and holds professorial appointments in UCLA’s School of Public Affairs and Henry Samueli School of Engineering and Applied Science, twenty-three year tenure at Harvard University , Pauly Doty, Founder and Director Emeritus of the Center for Science and International Affairs and Mallinckrodt Professor of Biochemistry, and an emeritus member of the BCSIA Board of Directors, Stanley Hoffmann, the Paul and Catherine Buttenweiser University Professor at Harvard University, Samuel Huntington, was an associate professor of government at Columbia University where he was also Deputy Director of The Institute for War and Peace Studies, Joseph Nye, University Distinguished Service Professor, and former Dean of the Kennedy School at Harvard, and Scott Sagan, Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science at Stanford, co-director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, and a Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute) 1983 “Living With Nuclear Weapons” p. 18-9

In the nuclear age, the dangers the United States faces are both numerous and enormous. It would be best if all these dangers could be eliminated, but in international relations as in politics, the goal is to relate the desirable to the possible. The impossibility of achieving perfect solutions should not, however, breed discouragement. It should only strengthen determination to persevere. When facing enormous problems, there is a special attraction to the assumption that only radical answers can suffice. Hence, the strong pull of utopian visions of both the extreme left and the extreme right: the ideas that only a world government can solve all our problems or that sheer military muscle is all that America needs. Both prescribe all-purpose solutions, but each ignores the real world. In the real world, packed with huge nuclear arsenals, mere military muscle, unless built and exercised with restraint and skill, will not ensure American security. In the real world of sovereign states, a world government is a dream for the distant future, not a practical goal for current policymakers. The danger of focusing on utopian objectives is that they can take attention away from practical and positive steps that can be taken now. Such actions may only produce incremental progress to war the goal of national security. But incremental steps matter. It would be a tragedy if opportunities for practical progress toward nuclear peace were missed because our goals were set too high, beyond the reach of what is possible. In his book The Fate of the Earth, Jonathan Schell has reminded people about the dangers of nuclear war, but his “solution” is precisely such an impossible goal. “The task,” he wrote, “is nothing less than to reinvent politics: to reinvent the world.” In reality, however, neither politics nor the world were invented by men, nor can either politics or the world be reinvented. Rather, these arrangements evolved through trial and error, through sacrifice and occasional gifted leadership, to an organization of life on earth that has reached unprecedented attainments. The nature of humanity, the complex mosaic of civilizations, the web of relations that unites so many nations cannot be taken apart and reinvented in the future. They can, we hope, continue to evolve. We are left, therefore, with our imperfect selves, imperfect nations, and imperfect realtions among them. And it is upon this imperfect structure that the capability of waging infinitely destructive nuclear war has descended. Humanity has no alternative but to hold this threat at bay and to learn to live with politics, to live in a world we know: a world of nuclear weapons, international rivalries, recurring conflicts, and at least some risk of nuclear crisis. The challenge we face is not to escape to a fictional utopia where such problems do not exist. It is to learn how to live with nuclear weapons in ways that are successively safer and in which the freedoms won by men and women are kept secure and can grow.

## 2AC

### Framework

#### This debate matters – use your ballot to stand in solidarity with the plan as a method to resist the possibility of nuclear war – this spillsover

HNSG (Harvard Nuclear Study Group – Albert Carnesale, UCLA Chancellor Emeritus and holds professorial appointments in UCLA’s School of Public Affairs and Henry Samueli School of Engineering and Applied Science, twenty-three year tenure at Harvard University , Pauly Doty, Founder and Director Emeritus of the Center for Science and International Affairs and Mallinckrodt Professor of Biochemistry, and an emeritus member of the BCSIA Board of Directors, Stanley Hoffmann, the Paul and Catherine Buttenweiser University Professor at Harvard University, Samuel Huntington, was an associate professor of government at Columbia University where he was also Deputy Director of The Institute for War and Peace Studies, Joseph Nye, University Distinguished Service Professor, and former Dean of the Kennedy School at Harvard, and Scott Sagan, Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science, co-director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, and a Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute) 1983 “Living With Nuclear Weapons” p. 10

Many citizens who are concerned about nuclear weapons policy, however, are deterred from learning more about it for two basic reasons. First, they think their opinion doesn’t matter. Many Americans seem to think: why bother to learn about these issues if no one in Washington listens to what I say, anyway? Second, some people, even if they want to learn more about nuclear weapons policy, strategy and arms control, hesitate because they think these issues are too complex for them to understand. Both attitudes are wrong. Individual opinions do matter. Each citizen is not just a target of nuclear weapons; each is also an actor in the nuclear drama. The opinions of the American public play an important, thought not always determinant, role in maintaining American Security. This is true in two ways.

#### Even if it doesn’t we still have an obligation to begin with questions of policy-making

jenny Edkins and maja Zehfuss Review of International Studies (2005), 31,p. 454-5

What we are attempting in this article is an intervention that demonstrates how the illusion of the sovereign state in an insecure and anarchic international system is sustained and how it might be challenged. It seems to us that this has become important in the present circumstances. The focus on security and the dilemma of security versus freedom that is set out in debates immediately after September 11th presents an apparent choice as the focus for dissent, while concealing the extent to which thinking is thereby confined to a specific agenda. Our argument will be that this approach relies on a particular picture of the political world that has been reflected within the discipline of international relations, a picture of a world of sovereign states. We have a responsibility as scholars; we are not insulated from the policy world. What we discuss may not, and indeed does not, have a direct impact on what happens in the policy world, this is clear, but our writings and our teaching do have an input in terms of the creation and reproduction of pictures of the world that inform policy and set the contours of policy debates.21 Moreover, the discipline within which we are situated is one which depends itself on a particular view of the world – a view that sees the international as a realm of politics distinct from the domestic – the same view of the world as the one that underpins thinking on security and defence in the US administration.22 In this article then we develop an analysis of the ways in which thinking in terms of international relations and a system of states forecloses certain possibilities from the start, and how it might look to think about politics and the international differently.

#### Localized visions of politics collapse all political horizons and inevitably lead to passivity – only embracing localized fictions of large scale political action can move us forward and fight the existing power structure

Charlie Bertsch (Ph.D. , English at UC-Berkeley) 1995 “Useful Fictions” Bad Subjects Online Journal Issue #19 http://bad.eserver.org/issues/1995/19/bertsch.html

Obviously, if we agree that an individual's will is constructed by social forces, then it becomes impossible to say that individuals are in complete control of their actions. Likewise, if we agree that qualities like race, gender, and sexual-preference are imposed on an individual by those forces, then it becomes impossible to state that a given individual is essentially anything. More generally, if we agree with this model, we are forced to acknowledge that the notion that individuals possess identity-in-the-singular is itself a construct. That is, we must acquiesce to the superficially radical idea that all identity is a fiction. We get a very different picture of transformational identities when we consider them in the light of this model. It suggests that transformational identities are not a special case, but the norm: if there can be no fixed identities, then what we have been calling 'transformations' are the only identities we have, plain and simple. Although this model suggests that all identities are fictional, its more extreme proponents — usually called 'post-structuralists' — reserve special animosity for the idea that the different identities an individual performs can somehow add up to a coherent 'self,' an identity-in-the-singular. They imply that the more time an identity must span and the greater the number of individual actions it must therefore encompass, the more dangerous it becomes. In a way, this is to argue that the problem is not which identities are made or how they are made, but that they sustain themselves at all. Unfortunately, if we draw this sort of conclusion from the constructivist model of identity, it is nearly impossible to imagine substantive political action. Almost all political action requires concerted effort towards a definite goal over time. And such effort, in turn, requires a reasonably stable identity. After all, it is impossible for individuals to strategize unless they know that they will have the same general goals tomorrow that they have today. In radically critiquing the idea of identity-in-the-singular, the post-structuralists who draw this conclusion ultimately promote passivity. Hegemony, Ideology, and Identity Of course, it is one thing to realize that all identity is a fiction, but quite another to decide what to do with that insight. We can draw other conclusions to from the constructivist model of identity, ones which can enable political action rather than inhibit it. In order to get a better sense of what they might look like, we need to take a detour through theory more directly concerned with the workings of society as a whole. When Marxist social theorist Antonio Gramsci looked at the Western world of the 1930s, he saw that vast numbers of people appeared strangely content to live within a power structure that runs counter to their own best interests. In trying to account for this phenomenon, Gramsci realized that the ruling class in modern societies does not rule by threat of force alone. He theorized that the majority of people in such societies behave themselves, not only because they fear punishment, but also because they consent to the power structure that maintains the status quo. Indeed, since most people do not break the law or seek to overthrow this power structure, it can be said that their consent plays a bigger role in perpetuating the dominance of the ruling class than does their fear of punishment. Gramsci called the achievement and maintenance of this consent 'hegemony.' Two aspects of Gramsci's theory of hegemony are particularly significant for our thinking about identity. The first is that he describes hegemony as a kind of cultural 'glue' able to bind and hold together very different sectors of modern societies, even ones which have little or nothing in common. As Stuart Hall phrases it in an article entitled 'Gramsci and Us,' hegemony 'does not reflect, it constructs a 'unity' out of difference.' The second aspect relates to the way hegemony manages to accomplish this. Because it resolves real differences into a semblance of unity, hegemony requires the creation and sustenance of an illusion. To put this another way, hegemony depends upon a collective fantasy in which conflicting sectors are perceived to be somehow alike, a fantasy that these sectors share a common identity. Hegemony is, in other words, a fiction of collective identity. But how does this relate to the issues surrounding individual identity that we have been discussing? Gramsci doesn't talk about individuals much, except to discuss the ways in which they bond together in organizations. As I will explain later, I think it might be good to start thinking about individuals in terms of collective identity. For now, however, we can turn to another Marxist social theorist who tried to build on both Gramsci's insights into collective identity and Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytic insights about individual identity. In the essay 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes Towards an Investigation' from which Bad Subjects derives its name, Louis Althusser revises the traditional Marxist definition of ideology. Instead of contrasting the illusions of ideology to the 'truth' of reality as Marx had implicitly done, Althusser argues that there is no escape from ideology. 'Ideology,' he writes, 'represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence.' Because our minds always 'mediate' (or filter) our relation to reality, it is not possible for us to have direct access to it. Instead, we only have indirect access to reality through the socially constructed fictions with which we define ourselves and our place in the world. To rephrase this insight in terms of our topic, because identity takes shape when we distinguish between what and where we are, and because it is socially constructed, it derives from our imaginary relationship to our real conditions of existence. We could say that, if ideology represents, then identity is a principal effect of that representation. If all identity is a fiction, then it must be ideology that creates and sustains that fiction. As we can see, Althusser clearly argues for a constructivist model of identity. Where he differs from the post-structuralist proponents of this model whom we discussed earlier, however, is in his distinction between ideology-in-general and ideologies in the plural. 'Ideology-in-general' refers to the inescapable fact that we can never access reality directly: we always perceive it through what Lacan called the 'imaginary,' through fictions. Ideologies, on the other hand, are the historically specific fictions with which people of a given place and time make sense of themselves and their relation to the world. Making this distinction allows us to conclude that, while we cannot escape ideology-in-general, there is a lot at stake in determining which specific ideologies dominate our lives. This returns us to Gramsci's notion of hegemony. Since hegemony really depends on the creation and sustenance of a collective fiction of identity, it is really just a specific ideology that holds sway over the majority of people in a society. As Althusser's argument suggests, hegemony is therefore not eternal, but something that can be challenged by other specific ideologies. From a leftist perspective, challenging hegemony requires the creation of an alternative fiction of collective identity. That is, if we wish to disassemble a particular power structure, it is not enough to say that it is bad. And it certainly isn't enough to show that it is glued together by a fiction that resolves real differences into a semblance of unity. Rather, we need to provide a different logic with which to make society cohere, one in keeping with our political goals. Clearly, the idea that all identity is a fiction need not induce passivity. If, as Althusser argues, there is no political action, no 'practice except by and in an ideology,' then we must construct fictions of identity adequate to our political project. Those adherents to the constructivist model of identity who are so suspicious of identities that can be sustained over time seem to forget that, as Karl Marx puts it in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 'men make their own history,' though 'not of their own free will; not under circumstances they themselves have chosen but under the given and inherited circumstances with which they are directly confronted.' They forget, in other words, that the social forces that construct identity result from the collective activity of human beings. Indeed, from Bad Subjects' leftist perspective, the strength of this model comes from its recognition that identities are made, not found. That its proponents would forget that the social forces that construct identity are themselves made, not found, seems remarkable. Useful Fictions As we mentioned earlier, we live in a society that, for all of its modernity, still reserves a prominent place for fantasies of transformation. The majority of these fantasies, however, narrate metamorphoses in which individuals change more or less independently of the society around them. When we do get narratives in which individual transformation is more closely linked to collective transformation, such as in science-fiction tales of the 1950s or Star Trek: The Next Generation's stories about the Borg, they tend to be extremely pessimistic. While becoming a vampire or murderer can give a character personality and even glamour, becoming a standardized cog in an impersonal machine cannot. What all this suggests is that, although we need to imagine transformation, we are encouraged to imagine it only as individual transformation. This is a phenomenon leftists would do well to consider. Certainly, there are times when it is useful to imagine individual transformations. As several articles in Bad Subjects have attested, autobiographical 'conversion' narratives can be a powerful way of communicating with people who might ignore an explicitly political message. In the long run, however, our goal is not just to 'reach' people, but to organize them into a new and better society. The left needs to turn the idea of transformation on its head. We do not need narratives of individual transformation within a society that does not change. Instead, we need to construct fictions of identity that inspire individuals to work for social change; fictions of identity that are predicated not on the individual's opposition to society, but on her or his integration into it; fictions of identity in which individuals act, not as autonomous individuals, but as part of a collective movement; fictions, finally, that are worth believing in.

#### Policy relevance is a pre-requisite to emancipation – purely theoretical focus ensures domination by current policy elites

Jeroen Gunning (lecturer in international politics at the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales) 2007 “A Case for Critical Terrorism Studies?” Blackwell Synergy

The notion of emancipation also crystallizes the need for policy engagement. For, unless a ‘critical’ field seeks to be policy relevant, which, as Cox rightly observes, means combining ‘critical’ and ‘problem-solving’ approaches, it does not fulfil its ‘emancipatory’ potential.94 One of the temptations of ‘critical’ approaches is to remain mired in critique and deconstruction without moving beyond this to reconstruction and policy relevance.95 Vital as such critiques are, the challenge of a critically constituted field is also to engage with policy makers – and ‘terrorists’ – and work towards the realization of new paradigms, new practices, and a transformation, however modestly, of political structures. That, after all, is the original meaning of the notion of ‘immanent critique’ that has historically underpinned the ‘critical’ project and which, in Booth's words, involves ‘the discovery of the latent potentials in situations on which to build political and social progress’, as opposed to putting forward utopian arguments that are not realizable. Or, as Booth wryly observes, ‘this means building with one's feet firmly on the ground, not constructing castles in the air’ and asking ‘what it means for real people in real places’.96 Rather than simply critiquing the status quo, or noting the problems that come from an un-problematized acceptance of the state, a ‘critical’ approach must, in my view, also concern itself with offering concrete alternatives. Even while historicizing the state and oppositional violence, and challenging the state's role in reproducing oppositional violence, it must wrestle with the fact that ‘the concept of the modern state and sovereignty embodies a coherent response to many of the central problems of political life’, and in particular to ‘the place of violence in political life’. Even while ‘de-essentializing and deconstructing claims about security’, it must concern itself with ‘how security is to be redefined’, and in particular on what theoretical basis.97 Whether because those critical of the status quo are wary of becoming co-opted by the structures of power (and their emphasis on instrumental rationality),98 or because policy makers have, for obvious reasons (including the failure of many ‘critical’ scholars to offer policy relevant advice), a greater affinity with ‘traditional’ scholars, the role of ‘expert adviser’ is more often than not filled by ‘traditional’ scholars.99 The result is that policy makers are insufficiently challenged to question the basis of their policies and develop new policies based on immanent critiques. A notable exception is the readiness of European Union officials to enlist the services of both ‘traditional’ and ‘critical’ scholars to advise the EU on how better to understand processes of radicalization.100 But this would have been impossible if more critically oriented scholars such as Horgan and Silke had not been ready to cooperate with the EU. Striving to be policy relevant does not mean that one has to accept the validity of the term ‘terrorism’ or stop investigating the political interests behind it. Nor does it mean that each piece of research must have policy relevance or that one has to limit one's research to what is relevant for the state, since the ‘critical turn’ implies a move beyond state-centric perspectives. End-users could, and should, thus include both state and non-state actors such as the Foreign Office and the Muslim Council of Britain and Hizb ut-Tahrir; the Northern Ireland Office and the IRA and the Ulster Unionists; the Israeli government and Hamas and Fatah (as long as the overarching principle is to reduce the political use of terror, whoever the perpetrator). It does mean, though, that a critically constituted field must work hard to bring together all the fragmented voices from beyond the ‘terrorism field’, to maximize both the field's rigour and its policy relevance. Whether a critically constituted ‘terrorism studies’ will attract the fragmented voices from outside the field depends largely on how broadly the term ‘critical’ is defined. Those who assume ‘critical’ to mean ‘Critical Theory’ or ‘poststructuralist’ may not feel comfortable identifying with it if they do not themselves subscribe to such a narrowly defined ‘critical’ approach. Rather, to maximize its inclusiveness, I would follow Williams and Krause's approach to ‘critical security studies’, which they define simply as bringing together ‘many perspectives that have been considered outside of the mainstream of the discipline’.101 This means refraining from establishing new criteria of inclusion/exclusion beyond the (normative) expectation that scholars self-reflexively question their conceptual framework, the origins of this framework, their methodologies and dichotomies; and that they historicize both the state and ‘terrorism’, and consider the security and context of all, which implies among other things an attempt at empathy and cross-cultural understanding.102

#### This depoliticized, local starting point causes extinction – turns case

Carl Boggs (Los Angeles Campus Full Time Faculty Professor) 1997 “The Great Retreat”

The decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America poses a series of great dilemmas and challenges. Many ideological currents scrutinized here ^ localism, metaphysics, spontaneism, post- modernism, Deep Ecology ^ intersect with and reinforce each other. While these currents have deep origins in popular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the 1990s. Despite their different outlooks and trajectories, they all share one thing in common: a depoliticized expression of struggles to combat and over- come alienation. The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved ^ perhaps even unrecognized ^ only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context of internationalized markets, ¢nance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or side- step these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions.74 In the meantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies. This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites ^ an already familiar dynamic in many lesser- developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise ^ or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collec- tive interests that had vanished from civil society.75

#### Global awareness is vital to build wise responses to emerging extinction threats – college curricular decisions should prioritize this question

Louis Rene, Beres (Prof. of International Law at Purdue) 2003 , Journal and Courier, June 5

The truth is often disturbing. Our impressive American victories against terrorism and rogue states, although proper and indispensable, are inevitably limited. The words of the great Irish poet Yeats reveal, prophetically, where our entire planet is now clearly heading. Watching violence escalate and expand in parts of Europe and Russia, in Northern Ireland, in Africa, in Southwest Asia, in Latin America, and of course in the Middle East, we discover with certainty that "... the centre cannot hold/Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world/The blood-dimmed tide is loosed/and everywhere The Ceremony of innocence is drowned." Our response, even after Operation Iraqi Freedom, lacks conviction. Still pretending that "things will get better," we Americans proceed diligently with our day-to-day affairs, content that, somehow, the worst can never really happen. Although it is true that we must go on with our normal lives, it is also true that "normal" has now become a quaint and delusionary state. We want to be sure that a "new" normal falls within the boundaries of human tolerance, but we can't nurture such a response without an informed appreciation of what is still possible. For us, other rude awakenings are unavoidable, some of which could easily overshadow the horrors of Sept. 11. There can be little doubt that, within a few short years, expanding tribalism will produce several new genocides and proliferating nuclear weapons will generate one or more regional nuclear wars. Paralyzed by fear and restrained by impotence, various governments will try, desperately, to deflect our attention, but it will be a vain effort. Caught up in a vast chaos from which no real escape is possible, we will learn too late that there is no durable safety in arms, no ultimate rescue by authority, no genuine remedy in science or technology. What shall we do? For a start, we must all begin to look carefully behind the news. Rejecting superficial analyses of day-to-day events in favor of penetrating assessments of world affairs, we must learn quickly to distinguish what is truly important from what is merely entertainment. With such learning, we Americans could prepare for growing worldwide anarchy not as immobilized objects of false contentment, but as authentic citizens of an endangered planet. Nowhere is it written that we people of Earth are forever, that humankind must thwart the long-prevailing trend among all planetary life-forms (more than 99 percent) of ending in extinction. Aware of this, we may yet survive, at least for a while, but only if our collective suppression of purposeful fear is augmented by a complementary wisdom; that is, that our personal mortality is undeniable and that the harms done by one tribal state or terror group against "others" will never confer immortality. This is, admittedly, a difficult concept to understand, but the longer we humans are shielded from such difficult concepts the shorter will be our time remaining. We must also look closely at higher education in the United States, not from the shortsighted stance of improving test scores, but from the urgent perspective of confronting extraordinary threats to human survival. For the moment, some college students are exposed to an occasional course in what is fashionably described as "global awareness," but such exposure usually sidesteps the overriding issues: We now face a deteriorating world system that cannot be mended through sensitivity alone; our leaders are dangerously unprepared to deal with catastrophic deterioration; our schools are altogether incapable of transmitting the indispensable visions of planetary restructuring. To institute productive student confrontations with survival imperatives, colleges and universities must soon take great risks, detaching themselves from a time-dishonored preoccupation with "facts" in favor of grappling with true life-or-death questions. In raising these questions, it will not be enough to send some students to study in Paris or Madrid or Amsterdam ("study abroad" is not what is meant by serious global awareness). Rather, all students must be made aware - as a primary objective of the curriculum - of where we are heading, as a species, and where our limited survival alternatives may yet be discovered. There are, of course, many particular ways in which colleges and universities could operationalize real global awareness, but one way, long-neglected, would be best. I refer to the study of international law. For a country that celebrates the rule of law at all levels, and which explicitly makes international law part of the law of the United States - the "supreme law of the land" according to the Constitution and certain Supreme Court decisions - this should be easy enough to understand. Anarchy, after all, is the absence of law, and knowledge of international law is necessarily prior to adequate measures of world order reform. Before international law can be taken seriously, and before "the blood-dimmed tide" can be halted, America's future leaders must at least have some informed acquaintance with pertinent rules and procedures. Otherwise we shall surely witness the birth of a fully ungovernable world order, an unheralded and sinister arrival in which only a shadowy legion of gravediggers would wield the forceps.

### Wilderson

#### Their perm answers demonstrate lack of alt solvency- Nothing is ever ‘pure’ enough for Wilderson – he has an agenda of propaganda and disinformation

Shane Graham (Associate Professor of English at Utah State University) 2009 “Incognegro: A Memoir of Exile and Apartheid” review of the book by Frank B. Wilderson III Cambridge, MA, South End Press, 2008, 501 pp. (pbk) 978-0-8960-8783-5. Safundi: The Journal of South African and American Studies

Vol. 10, No. 4, October 2009, 479–494

Were you upset, offended, or outraged by Breyten Breytenbach’s recent article in Harper’s Magazine, in which he took Nelson Mandela to task for all the failings of the post-apartheid administrations? If you were bothered by Breytenbach’s piece, I would recommend avoiding Frank Wilderson’s Incognegro. In it, the author recalls declaring in 1989 that Madiba would be of greater service to the revolution dead than alive. Throughout the book he repeatedly rails against ‘‘Mandela’s people’’ as agents for an accommodationist, neo-liberal agenda. He even recounts a speech he attended in 1994 by the newly elected state president, in which he stood up and grilled Mandela about plans for the Reconstruction and Development Program. This all culminated in 1995 with a phone call from a Mail & Guardian reporter who asked for a comment because ‘‘Nelson Mandela thinks you’re a threat to national security’’ (470). The book jacket declares that Wilderson is one of only two Americans ever to be a member of the African National Congress (ANC). An African American, he first visited South Africa in 1989 on a brief research expedition, during which he met the Tswana woman he would later marry. He settled more permanently in Johannesburg in 1991, where he was soon elected to the executive council of the local and subregional branches of the ANC. But even as he was holding aboveground positions in the newly unbanned liberation party, he was also working with an underground cell loyal to Chris Hani and Winnie Mandela, in defiance of Nelson Mandela’s decision to disband Umkhonto we Sizwe and cease all covert operations. In this capacity, Wilderson ‘‘gathered information on [visiting] Americans and worked on psychological warfare, propaganda, disinformation, and general political analysis’’ (276). From his position as lecturer, first at Wits University and later at the Soweto campus of Vista University, he was charged with capturing ‘‘as much territory (real and imagined) of the university-industrial complex before the ANC came to power as possible’’ (143). Wilderson’s perspective on the events of 1989–1996 is unique: he sees the seminal moments of South Africa’s transition both as an insider (as an elected official in the ANC) and as an outsider who never fully gains the trust of the party’s power structure. And whereas even a couple of years ago his condemnations of the ‘‘New South Africa’’ and its economic policies might have struck many middle-class South African readers as strident and delusional, the predictions he recalls making now seem undeniably prescient in light of the recent power shift within the ANC. After all, one wonders whether Jacob Zuma’s demagoguery would have ever found political traction had Thabo Mbeki’s wing of the party not succeeded in prioritizing laissez-faire liberalism above material reparations for the poor. Had Wilderson been content to write a political memoir of his modest but interesting role in the South African transition, it would have been a slender but compelling, occasionally even gripping, book. Instead, Wilderson gives us a sprawling 500-page tome that attempts to serve not just as political memoir but also as autobiography, therapeutic exercise, and character assassination against former colleagues, to whom he gives very thinly veiled pseudonyms. As an account of growing up black in the white United States, Incognegro offers a few engaging stories: he visited Fred Hampton’s house in Chicago at age thirteen, soon after Hampton had been shot dead by police; and he took part in battles with the police and national guard in Berkeley in 1969. Otherwise, though, the book’s representation of the black experience in America covers familiar ground and adds little to our understanding of that experience beyond fresh layers of indignation and rage. Worse still are the chapters narrating Wilderson’s life after leaving South Africa in 1996, when he moved to California, started a relationship with a white woman, and became embroiled in the cutthroat and frequently racist politics at Cabrillo College, where he found employment. These sections of the book, frankly, are irritating to read for their tone of alternating self-loathing, self-pity, and selfrighteousness. Wilderson’s incessant outrage may often be justified, but it just as often seems petty and juvenile. For example, he describes one ‘‘diversity workshop’’ at Cabrillo at which he feels ‘‘I’d like to behave but I’m bored to tears’’ (428); and he takes great delight in comparing the liberal ideologues at Wits to tokoloshes1 in an extended metaphor that the author elaborates for many pages. After reading such scenes, as well as many others in which Wilderson behaves basely toward the people he is closest to, I began to wonder to what extent his radicalism is driven by principle, and to what extent it is simply a legitimizing front for a childish, hyperactive obstreperousness. As the comrade who recruited him for the ANC tells him, ‘‘You have no sense of your environment, and you seem not to care’’ (135). Even his mother tells him that he has a ‘‘Classic persecution complex’’ (486). The difficulty of reviewing a book such as this is that the author would no doubt respond to any criticism (of the book’s tone, for instance, or of its clumsy, selfconsciously postmodern structure, which jumps randomly between time frames) by attacking the reviewer as a deluded quisling of the global capitalist establishment and ‘‘blah, blah, blah’’ (to quote Wilderson’s own paraphrase of Mandela’s response to his aforementioned question). In my pre-emptive self-defence, I can only emphasize again that it is this memoir’s narcissism and self-indulgent tone that made it an unpleasant read for me, not its politics. There is no doubt that the revolution let down a lot of people. But it was always going to let down Frank Wilderson because it seems that, for him, nothing can ever be pure enough.

#### Wilderson film based analysis is exaggerated, overly US-centric, and excludes the lens of gender – his thesis that Anti-Blackness creates ontological death is epistemologically flawed and should be rejected outright

Saër Maty Ba (Professor of Film – University of Portsmouth and Co-Editor – The Encyclopedia of Global Human Migration) “The US Decentred: From Black Social Death to Cultural Transformation” September 2011 , Cultural Studies Review, 17(2), , p. 385-387, <http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/csrj/article/viewFile/2304/2474>

A few pages into Red, White and Black, I feared that it would just be a matter of time before Wilderson’s black‐as‐social‐death idea and multiple attacks on issues and scholars he disagrees with run (him) into (theoretical) trouble. This happens in chapter two, ‘The Narcissistic Slave’, where he critiques black film theorists and books. For example, Wilderson declares that Gladstone Yearwood’s Black Film as Signifying Practice (2000) ‘betrays a kind of conceptual anxiety with respect to the historical object of study— ... it clings, anxiously, to the film‐as‐text‐as‐legitimateobject of Black cinema.’ (62) He then quotes from Yearwood’s book to highlight ‘just how vague the aesthetic foundation of Yearwood’s attempt to construct a canon can be’. (63) And yet Wilderson’s highlighting is problematic because it overlooks the ‘Diaspora’ or ‘African Diaspora’, a key component in Yearwood’s thesis that, crucially, neither navel‐gazes (that is, at the US or black America) nor pretends to properly engage with black film. Furthermore, Wilderson separates the different waves of black film theory and approaches them, only, in terms of how a most recent one might challenge its precedent. Again, his approach is problematic because it does not mention or emphasise the inter‐connectivity of/in black film theory. As a case in point, Wilderson does not link Tommy Lott’s mobilisation of Third Cinema for black film theory to Yearwood’s idea of African Diaspora. (64) Additionally, of course, Wilderson seems unaware that Third Cinema itself has been fundamentally questioned since Lott’s 1990s’ theory of black film was formulated. Yet another consequence of ignoring the African Diaspora is that it exposes Wilderson’s corpus of films as unable to carry the weight of the transnational argument he attempts to advance. Here, beyond the US‐centricity or ‘social and political specificity of [his] filmography’, (95) I am talking about Wilderson’s choice of films. For example, Antwone Fisher (dir. Denzel Washington, 2002) is attacked unfairly for failing to acknowledge ‘a grid of captivity across spatial dimensions of the Black “body”, the Black “home”, and the Black “community”’ (111) while films like Alan and Albert Hughes’s Menace II Society (1993), overlooked, do acknowledge the same grid and, additionally, problematise Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (STEP) policing. The above examples expose the fact of Wilderson’s dubious and questionable conclusions on black film. Red, White and Black is particularly undermined by Wilderson’s propensity for exaggeration and blinkeredness. In chapter nine, ‘“Savage” Negrophobia’, he writes: The philosophical anxiety of Skins is all too aware that through the Middle Passage, African culture became Black ‘style’ ... Blackness can be placed and displaced with limitless frequency and across untold territories, by whoever so chooses. Most important, there is nothing real Black people can do to either check or direct this process ... Anyone can say ‘nigger’ because anyone can be a ‘nigger’. (235)7 Similarly, in chapter ten, ‘A Crisis in the Commons’, Wilderson addresses the issue of ‘Black time’. Black is irredeemable, he argues, because, at no time in history had it been deemed, or deemed through the right historical moment and place. In other words, the black moment and place are not right because they are ‘the ship hold of the Middle Passage’: ‘the most coherent temporality ever deemed as Black time’ but also ‘the “moment” of no time at all on the map of no place at all’. (279) Not only does Pinho’s more mature analysis expose this point as preposterous (see below), I also wonder what Wilderson makes of the countless historians’ and sociologists’ works on slave ships, shipboard insurrections and/during the Middle Passage,8 or of groundbreaking jazz‐studies books on cross‐cultural dialogue like The Other Side of Nowhere (2004). Nowhere has another side, but once Wilderson theorises blacks as socially and ontologically dead while dismissing jazz as ‘belonging nowhere and to no one, simply there for the taking’, (225) there seems to be no way back. It is therefore hardly surprising that Wilderson ducks the need to provide a solution or alternative to both his sustained bashing of blacks and anti‐ Blackness.9 Last but not least, Red, White and Black ends like a badly plugged announcement of a bad Hollywood film’s badly planned sequel: ‘How does one deconstruct life? Who would benefit from such an undertaking? The coffle approaches with its answers in tow.’ (340) —PINHO AS FRESH AIR: AFRO-MYTHS AND BLACK ATLANTIC IDENTITIES Pinho favours detailed and measured presentation of an idea, term or argument, followed by an equally in‐depth and careful critique. Her book is a breath of fresh air because, for one thing, Pinho knows that what blacks must breathe is called air and that it shall keep them alive. Metaphorically, of course, breathing means being aware that for scattered blacks Africa is not necessarily a nation‐state or place of return. Rather, Africa can be an ‘imaginary community’, (25) albeit one which entails mythic connections to Africa‐as‐place. Lucid and fair, Pinho unambiguously identifies and critiques such linkages through the myth of ‘Mama Africa’. Thus, Pinho focuses on what the term ‘myth’ means and three reasons for choosing it to study the blocos afro’s (Carnival Afro) reinventions of Mama Africa. VOLUME17 388 NUMBER2 SEP2011 Myth embodies the subtleties and power of narratives explaining and interpreting the world. Myth carries ‘values, messages, and ideals’ and is therefore crucial to dispersed peoples’ self‐produced stories and representations (2) while connected to and contaminating ‘reality’. (20) For example, Mama Africa generates and is in turn generated by identities, and only at the zones of contact between myth and identity can one hope to grasp its meaning. Bahia’s own version is a ‘metaphysical’ nourishing body at once ‘source of [racial] purity’ and ongoing dispenser of the essence of black life. (30) Bahia activates this myth through different means: music, aesthetics and religion (32–3); the blocos afro’s Africa as ‘the “place of origin” of Afro‐Brazilian ancestors’; and how it extends to countries in the African diaspora, such as Jamaica, Cuba and the USA, envisioned ‘as branches of Mama Africa’. (39) Crucially, Pinho notes that the Bahian Mama Africa does not own her body, while the myth itself echoes problematic representations of black womanhood. (30) Invoking such representations signals Pinho’s serious commitment to seriously examining blackness as diasporic. For example, she investigates the role agency plays in embracing Afro‐aesthetics (86) while arguing that a deeper meaning of such embrace comes from both an ongoing process of imagining and reinventing Africa (121) and that, in Brazil, adopting Afro‐aesthetics changes according to age, gender, geography and political commitment to ‘the black social movement’. (125) But what does the ‘Afro’ of Afro‐Bahian identities mean? Several things, according to Pinho: to embody Mama Africa through difference and by manipulating the body (89); tradition, for example, ‘rhythms believed to originate from Africa’; ‘purity’, such as the ability to remain faithful to African roots (90) or, as Nelson Mendes of the bloco Olodum states in an interview, to defend ‘the proposal of moving beyond boundaries’. (95) Therefore ‘Afro’ seems to signify an acknowledgement that race and blackness cannot exist separately while black identities must be mutable. (96–7) And yet, the blocos’ anti‐racist discourse keeps on retreating (in)to the body, and consequently undermines both the race‐blackness connection and mutability of black identities: why? Saër Maty Bâ—The US Decentred 389 —‘AFRICA’ IN BODY AND SOUL: PINHO AGAINST POLICING THE BLACK BODY Why? Because in Brazil the ‘alleged smell of the slaves’ bodies became an additional excuse for classifying them closer to animals than to humans’. (105) Attitudes resulting from this mindset permeate ways in which the body remains a place in which to re‐inscribe Africa as source of beauty and restoration of dignity. Additionally, nowadays black bodies are present(ed) positively in Brazil’s shopping malls, magazines, TV/soap operas, advertisements, and education. The blocos afro, created in the 1970s ‘under the influence of’ the US Black is Beautiful movement, can take credit for this presence’. (115) In other words, blocos afro develop a black identity through stories of ‘Africanness and representations of blackness’, an identity aligned with their ‘strategies of social promotion [connecting] discourse and practice ... culture and politics’. (117) It would be preposterous to talk about black Brazilians as socially or ontologically dead. At the same time, to take issues with Afro‐Brazilian activists’ and blocos’ anti‐racist discourse seems an arduous task. This is because it is grounded in engagement with history, place, federal and local government race policies (or race denials), and day‐to‐day anti‐black racism. Nevertheless, as Pinho rightly remarks, this anti‐racist discourse overlooks gender analysis: seldom do activists and blocos make reference to how ‘racism affects men and women differently’ while they fail ‘to question’ their own sexism, which leads to the female black body remaining ‘the preferred locus for performing the pedagogy of blackness’ through black beauty pageants for example. (136) Pinho objects to the policing of black women’s bodies, opposes notions of ethnic black identities and Mama Africa (158) at the same time as she finds linkages between biology, culture and politics problematic. Her suggested alternatives are most enlightening: one must remember that identities ... are constructed in the context of late capitalism, in which liberalism and discipline, coupled with bureaucracy, impinge on the most subjective conditions of identities ... we need to envision the possibility of constructing identities that are not based on the same terms that emerged out of colonialism and that circulated as a means to legitimize subordination and power. (175) VOLUME17 390 NUMBER2 SEP2011 —SOUR MILK AND CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION: PINHO AGAINST AFROCENTRISM Pinho’s above suggestions can be, but are not easily, achieved. At the time of (her) writing it was no longer a question of if, but one of how, to see the fusion of black culture with baianidade/Bahian culture. Aware of this issue, she suggests that we step out of ‘Manichean and superficial’ Afrocentrism so as to see the largely ‘artificial’ character of classifications ‘black culture’ and ‘Bahian culture’ and to take into account ‘the agency of cultural producers’. (198–9) Accordingly, I find stimulating Pinho’s courage to declare that to objectify identities does not necessarily create estrangement; without objectification cultures cannot expand and reproduce, (209) and cultural transformation needs to be promoted. In turn, to transform culture demands a re‐thinking of what equality means because: Equal should not be understood as same ... To see equality as sameness is like viewing racelessness as whiteness. It is a formulation that allows ‘white’ to be the neutral standard from which black differs; or ‘man’ to be the neutral standard against which women are compared. (220–1) Put simply, I welcome the above statement and Pinho’s overall thesis. I wish Wilderson paid attention to books like Pinho’s, Cedric J. Robinson’s Black Marxism (1983) or W.E.B. DuBois’s Black Reconstruction in America (1935), and to the ideas of Kwame A. Appiah, Cornel West, Marc Reed, Simone de Beauvoir, Eric Robert Taylor, to name but a few. Had Wilderson done so, his book could have been balanced. Red, White and Black is of almost no use to film studies scholars. I find it additionally useless because I believe that the USA is not the world’s centre, and that US antagonisms, related to cinema or not, are always‐already multiply outernational.

### Counter Advocacy

#### Energy POLICY matters and we need policy action to address the pressing energy needs of the US and the world- Must evaluate consequences

Wirth, Gray & Podesta, ‘3 The Future of Energy Policy Timothy E. Wirth, C. Boyden Gray, and John D. Podesta Timothy E. Wirth is President of the United Nations Foundation and a former U.S. Senator from Colorado. C. Boyden Gray is a partner at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering and served as Counsel to former President George H.W. Bush. John D. Podesta is Visiting Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center and served as Chief of Staff to former President Bill Clinton. Volume 82 • Number 4 Foreign Affairs 2003 Council on Foreign Relations

¶ A century ago, Lord Selborne, the ﬁrst lord of the Admiralty,¶ dismissed the idea of fueling the British navy with something other than¶ coal, which the island nation had in great abundance. “The substitution¶ of oil for coal is impossible,” he pronounced, “because oil does not¶ exist in this world in su⁄cient quantities.” Seven years later, the young¶ Winston Churchill was appointed ﬁrst lord and charged with winning¶ the escalating Anglo-German race for naval superiority. As Daniel¶ Yergin chronicled in The Prize, Churchill saw that oil would increase¶ ship speed and reduce refueling time—key strategic advantages—and¶ ordered oil-burning battleships to be built, committing the navy to¶ this new fuel. Churchill’s was a strategic choice, bold, creative, and¶ farsighted. The energy choices the world faces today are no less¶ consequential, and America’s response must be as insightful. ¶ Energy is fundamental to U.S. domestic prosperity and national¶ security. In fact, the complex ties between energy and U.S. national¶ interests have drawn tighter over time. The advent of globalization,¶ the growing gap between rich and poor, the war on terrorism, and¶ the need to safeguard the earth’s environment are all intertwined¶ with energy concerns.¶ The profound changes of recent decades and the pressing challenges¶ of the twenty-ﬁrst century warrant recognizing energy’s central role in¶ America’s future and the need for much more ambitious and creative¶ approaches. Yet the current debate about U.S. energy policy is mainly¶ about tax breaks for expanded production, access to public lands, and¶ nuances of electricity regulation—di⁄cult issues all, but inadequate for¶ the larger challenges the United States faces. The staleness of the policy¶ dialogue reﬂects a failure to recognize the importance of energy to¶ the issues it aªects: defense and homeland security, the economy, and the¶ environment. What is needed is a purposeful, strategic energy policy,¶ not a grab bag drawn from interest-group wish lists.¶ U.S. energy policies to date have failed to address three great challenges. The ﬁrst is the danger to political and economic security¶ posed by the world’s dependence on oil. Next is the risk to the global¶ environment from climate change, caused primarily by the combustion¶ of fossil fuels. Finally, the lack of access by the world’s poor to modern¶ energy services, agricultural opportunities, and other basics needed¶ for economic advancement is a deep concern.¶ None of these problems of dependence, climate change, or poverty¶ can be solved overnight, but aggressive goals and practical short-term¶ initiatives can jump-start the move to clean and secure energy practices.¶ The key challenges can be overcome with a blend of carefully targeted¶ policy interventions that build on the power of the market, publicprivate partnerships in ﬁnancing and technology development, and,¶ perhaps most important, the development of a political coalition¶ that abandons traditional assumptions and brings together energy¶ interests that have so far engaged only in conﬂict. Turning this¶ ambitious, long-term agenda into reality requires a sober assessment¶ of the United States’ critical energy challenges and the interests that¶ can be mobilized for the necessary political change.

### Risk K

#### Rejecting strategic predictions of threats makes them inevitable—decisionmakers will rely on preconceived conceptions of threat rather than the more qualified predictions of analysts

Fitzsimmons 7. (Michael, “The Problem of Uncertainty in Strategic Planning”, Survival, Winter 06/07)

But handling even this weaker form of uncertainty is still quite challeng- ing. If not sufficiently bounded, a high degree of variability in planning factors can exact a significant price on planning. The complexity presented by great variability strains the cognitive abilities of even the most sophisticated decision- makers.15 And even a robust decision-making process sensitive to cognitive limitations necessarily sacrifices depth of analysis for breadth as variability and complexity grows. It should follow, then, that in planning under conditions of risk, variability in strategic calculation should be carefully tailored to available analytic and decision processes. Why is this important? What harm can an imbalance between complexity and cognitive or analytic capacity in strategic planning bring? Stated simply, where analysis is silent or inadequate, **the personal beliefs of decision-makers** **fill the void**. As political scientist Richard Betts found in a study of strategic sur- prise, in ‘an environment that lacks clarity, abounds with conflicting data, and allows no time for rigorous assessment of sources and validity, ambiguity allows intuition or wishfulness to drive interpretation ... The greater the ambiguity, the greater the impact of preconceptions.’16 The decision-making environment that Betts describes here is one of political-military crisis, not long-term strategic planning. But a strategist who sees uncertainty as the central fact of his environ- ment brings upon himself some of the pathologies of crisis decision-making. He invites ambiguity, takes conflicting data for granted and **substitutes a priori scepticism about the validity of prediction** for time pressure as a rationale for discounting the importance of analytic rigour. It is important not to exaggerate the extent to which data and ‘rigorous assessment’ can illuminate strategic choices. Ambiguity is a fact of life, and scepticism of analysis is necessary. Accordingly, the intuition and judgement of decision-makers will always be vital to strategy, and attempting to subordinate those factors to some formulaic, deterministic decision-making model would be both undesirable and unrealistic. All the same, there is danger in the opposite extreme as well. Without careful analysis of what is relatively likely and what is relatively unlikely, what will be the possible bases for strategic choices? A decision-maker with no faith in prediction is left with little more than a set of worst-case scenarios and his existing beliefs about the world to confront the choices before him. Those beliefs may be more or less well founded, but if they are not made explicit and subject to analysis and debate regarding their application to particular strategic contexts, they remain only beliefs and premises, rather than rational judgements. Even at their best, such decisions are likely to be poorly understood by the organisations charged with their implementation. At their worst, such decisions may be poorly understood by the decision-makers themselves.

#### Calls to address specific security threats are key to solve those problems without succumbing to the pratfalls of the Bush Doctrine

Kailyn Nicholson and Anna Schaffer - Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies - 3/10/2011, The Future of U.S. Democracy Promotion: Strategies for a Sustainable Fourth Wave of Democratization, https://digital.lib.washington.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/1773/16487/Task%20Force%20C%202011%20Web.pdf?sequence=1

Democracy Promotion in Rhetoric The current administration has attempted to steer clear of unrealistic rhetoric in favor of a more pragmatic doctrine. This resolution appears to reflect the Obama administration‘s efforts to disassociate from the Bush-era rhetoric that provoked such global criticism. Post 9/11, the Bush administration was seen to sway between a preemptive realism that sought to unilaterally maintain America‘s position of power in the world and a lofty Wilsonian rhetoric that espoused spreading democratic ideals to all corners of the globe. Especially under Bush‘s Freedom Agenda, supporting democracy and the promotion of freedom was embraced as a foreign policy goal. The Freedom Agenda incorporated or helped to justify the global war on terror and Iraqi invasion. Increasingly weak evidence to support initial justifications for intervention eventually gave way to the language of democracy promotion as a more appealing rhetoric. And, Iraq became the centerpiece of this agenda executed in the name of promoting democratic values and supporting human rights. In his second inaugural address in 2005, former President Bush stated, So it is the policy of the U.S. to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world…We will encourage reform in other governments by making clear that success in our relations will require decent treatment of their own people. America‘s belief in human dignity will guide our principles (Bush 2005) In claiming that the long-term goal of the U.S. was to end ‗tyranny in our world,‘ Bush set unrealistic and idealized expectations for the results of democracy promotion. Much of the justifications by the Bush administration for democracy promotion asserted the moral grounds for democracy. In a speech at the 2008 World Economic Forum in Sharm el-Sheikh Egypt, former President Bush pronounced: Some say any state that holds an election is a democracy. But true democracy requires vigorous political parties allowed to engage in free and lively debate. True democracy requires the establishment of civic institutions that ensure an election‘s legitimacy and hold leaders accountable. And true democracy requires competitive elections in which opposition candidates are allowed to campaign without fear or intimidation. Too often in the Middle East, politics has consisted of one leader and the opposition in jail. America is deeply concerned about the plight of political prisoners in this region, as well as democratic activists who are intimidated or repressed, newspapers and civil society organizations that are shut down, and dissidents whose voices are stifled. The time has come for nations across the Middle East to abandon these practices, and treat their people with dignity and the respect they deserve (Bush 2008) Here, former President Bush professed to stand behind democratic forces in all states. The fact that this speech took place three years after the 2005 Egyptian presidential election, where one candidate, Ayman Nour, was imprisoned, highlights a thread of hypocrisy in Bush‘s lofty rhetoric. Alternatively, the Obama administration adopted a more realistic rhetoric that gave recognition to other national interests, including security interests and threats to U.S. security. In response to the discourse and policies of the previous administration President Obama stated: Indeed, one of the lessons of our effort in Iraq is that American influence around the world is not a function of military force alone. We must use all elements of our power -- including our diplomacy, our economic strength, and the power of America's example -- to secure our interests and stand by our allies. And we must project a vision of the future that's based not just on our fears, but also on our hopes -- a vision that recognizes the real dangers that exist around the world (Obama 2010) Indeed, Obama‘s rhetoric implies a much more pragmatic approach than that of the previous administration. Here, Obama stated the need for balancing various U.S. interests and real-world threats, while also acknowledging tensions. One critique of Obama states, ―If there is an Obama doctrine emerging, it is one much more realpolitik than his predecessor‘s, focused on relations with traditional great powers and relegating issues like human rights and democracy to second-tier concerns‖ (Baker 2010). However, it should be noted and taken into consideration that pragmatic responses advocated by the Obama administration may have been influenced by the legacy issues left from the previous administration. It is possible the Obama administration has taken a realistic and pragmatic approach because it is an alternative to the last administration. Therefore, it is important to consider how foreign policy is influenced by legacy and also how it may be constrained by reality. In any case, within any administration, Wilsonian ideals and moral values are never to be ignored. In his most recent State of the Union address Obama gave support to human rights and noted: Recent events have shown us that what sets us apart must not just be our power – it must also be the purpose behind it. In south Sudan – with our assistance – the people were finally able to vote for independence after years of war….And we saw that same desire to be free in Tunisia, where the will of the people proved more powerful than the writ of a dictator. And tonight, let us be clear: The U.S. of America stands with the people of Tunisia, and supports the democratic aspirations of all people (Obama 2011) While Obama does still express support for human rights and democratic values he does so with an air of caution. Unlike the previous administration, this administration refrains from soaring unrealistic rhetoric in favor of a more pragmatic and realistic rhetoric regarding foreign policy and democracy promotion. In doing so, this current administration is seen to be noticeably less hypocritical and inconsistent than the previous. C. Implementation: Rhetoric in Action? In reality U.S. democracy promotion efforts have not reflected the rhetoric surrounding it. Democracy promotion is inconsistent country to country and policy to policy. Actions do not reflect the language expressed by policy makers to support democracy. After the Bush administration it has become increasingly entangled with military interests resulting in the association of democracy promotion with regime change and forceful coercion. Under the façade of democracy promotion, policies may implement a top-down effort supporting supposed democratic leaders rather than fostering democratic values from the bottom-up through civil society. Its exclusiveness and selectiveness is seen when we support democracy in one state and ignore human rights in another. Within the Bush administration a large gap existed between talk and action whether it was the continued cozy relations with the Saudi government, the U.S. embrace of Pakistan‘s former military dictator Pervez Musharraf, or the largely uncritical line toward China‘s continued authoritarianism (Carothers 2007). In the Middle East, the Bush administration later came to characterize its interventionin Iraq as a democratizing mission, when clearly other interests, particularly security interests were involved from the start. Other U.S. autocratic allies in the region felt almost no pressure at all, despite the Bush team‘s grand pronouncements about its commitment to a politically transformed region (Carothers 2007). Instead, the Bush administration worked to tighten relations with allies in the region in an effort to create a friendly coalition of states that would serve as useful partners in the War on Terror and would help to maintain the balance of power as it was in the Middle East. Thus, the statement of principles made by President Bush at the World Economic Forum in Egypt in 2008 rarely applies to Egypt or other U.S. allies in the Middle East. Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Pakistan, Ethiopia have all escaped the rhetoric of supporting human rights and democratic values by the Bush administration(Carothers 2007). Indeed, inconsistency between rhetoric and action is widespread; however, inconsistency in rhetoric between private and public audiences also exists. This is a different situation where the U.S. presents public rhetoric of support, for example, in the case of Egypt -prior to the year 2011- but expresses disapproval and criticisms in private. The recent release of WikiLeaks documents has revealed how American diplomats have repeatedly raised concerns with Egyptian officials about jailed dissidents and bloggers. A 2009 cable from U.S. ambassador to Egypt, Margaret Scobey, highlighted the difficulty of promoting democracy in a state that is both a strategic ally, but also a partial democracy ruled by an oppressive president: We continue to promote democratic reform in Egypt, including the expansion of political freedom and pluralism, and respect for human rights. Egyptian democracy and human rights efforts, however, are being stymied, and the GoE [Government of Egypt] remains skeptical of our role in democracy promotion, complaining that any efforts to open up will result in empowering the Muslim Brotherhood, which currently holds 86 seats in Egypt's 454-seat parliament (Embassy Cairo. 2009) However, the documents also show that relations between Mubarak and Obama warmed up as a result of Obama playing down what was the so-called ‗name and shame‘ approach of the Bush Administration (Landler and Lehren 2011). The nature of the WikiLeaks documents concerning Egypt draw attention to a balancing of private pressure with strong public support for Mubarak under the current administration-underscoring yet another sign of inconsistency. II. How False U.S. Rhetoric Has Hurt U.S. Reputation and Image While the U.S. has unparalleled economic and military assets, American influence and standing in the world are significantly low. Frequent gaps between rhetoric and behavior, policy changes or even reversals have harmed the U.S. image as an international power and moral figure. This negative image is partially a consequence of false rhetoric. A recent committee on human rights in Washington acknowledged, ―The world is not blind to this double standard. When they see the U.S. promoting human rights, not as a matter of principle but as a matter of convenience, it saps these principles of much of their force, and it makes the U.S. a much less powerful moral force on behalf of the values that this Nation stands for‖ (U.S. 2008). Even among other Western nations, the U.S. is seen to have a weak stance concerning human rights. In 1998, The United States Information Agency (USIA) found that 59 percent of the British and 61 percent of Germans said the U.S. was doing a good job promoting human rights. Today, 56 percent of the British and 78 percent of Germans say the US is doing a bad job (Kull 2007). Clearly, opinions of the U.S. on human rights issues have degraded significantly. An American rhetoric supporting human rights and democratic ideals worldwide while, simultaneously, failing to be consistent in implementing this rhetoric evidently will influence this degradation. The U.S. is viewed as hypocritical in its rhetoric about human rights and democracy because it is seen to be selective in its actual application. American leaders pursue more confrontational strategies for supporting democratic change against those countries with strained relations with the U.S. and adopt policies of engagement to induce or, at times, overlook democratic change with allies and friends. ―Close American relationships with authoritarian regimes in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and cordial relationships with autocratic rulers in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Equatorial Guinea, undermine U.S. credibility when criticizing similar types of autocratic regimes with less friendly ties to Washington‖ (McFaul 2010,163). Rhetoric about liberty has been juxtaposed with the instability in Iraq and democracy promotion has become associated with regime change. In the past decade, ―the rhetorical conflation by the Bush Administration and its allies of the war in Iraq and democracy promotion has muddied the meaning of the democracy project, diminishing support for it at home and abroad‖ (Melia 2007, 12). Public opinion polls from a 2005 survey by the Pew Research Center found the U.S. to be broadly disliked in most countries surveyed. Furthermore, a degrading trend in U.S. image can be seen as a repercussion of the inconsistency in rhetoric and policy of the past. A poll, conducted for BBC World Service in 18 countries, tracked this issue from 2005-2007. ―On average, positive views of the U.S. have slipped from 40 percent in 2005 to 36 percent in 2006 to 29 percent in 2007. Negative views have risen from 46 percent in 2005 to 52 percent in 2007‖ (Kull 2007). What‘s more, Gallup Polls in 143 countries reveal the image of the leadership of the U.S. is generally poor worldwide, but that the Obama administration will have the most repair work to do on its image in the predominantly Muslim Middle East and North Africa, where regional median approval is just 15 percent (Ray 2009). One year into his term, global opinion polls taken by Gallup reflect a positive view of Obama‘s leadership and foreign policy, yet, still present mixed reviews towards his handlings of trouble spots in the Middle East (English 2010). Such negative views of the U.S. erode U.S. power and undermine U.S. influence abroad. III. Democracy Promotion as a Façade for Promoting Other U.S. Interests The point where democracy promotion rhetoric does not properly align with implementation of supporting democracy, in any given state, is a sign of inconsistency and the use of democracy promotion as a façade for promoting other U.S. interests. Inconsistency between rhetoric and action in democracy promotion highlights the varying and diverse interests of the U.S. where democracy promotion, at times, wrongly serves the purpose of justifying other non-related and sometimes contrary U.S. interests. While the U.S. does wish to support and uphold human rights and the universal concept of economic, social and political freedoms, these interests somehow fall behind other US interests. This raises the questions of: whether U.S. interests are presented as prioritized? And how does one account for the supremacy of security interests over values of supporting human rights and democracy in general? This section will first examine U.S. interests from a Wilsonian, idealist view and next, from a realist view. These two schools of thought concerning foreign policy and inevitably, democracy promotion are today seen to be in opposition with each other. This can be accounted for by the short-term mindset of foreign policy in any given administration. Foreign policy is bound to vary with each new administration, within the same administration or due to a change in the global landscape. A forward-looking foreign policy strategy encourages a balance between interests of supporting human rights and moral values (so called idealist interests), and realist tendencies to focus solely on security and strategic interests. The current strategy, however, juxtaposes these two interest views and prompts a choice between the two. Thus, while it is in U.S. interests in the long-term to promote democracy as an end in itself, U.S. actions concerning democracy promotion currently seem to be motivated and driven by short-term interests. This section will analyze where focus on short-term realist interests has prompted a lack of clarity and consistency in policies. In this manner, democracy promotion is used as a tool, rather than an end, to maintain or secure other strategic interests. What‘s more, efforts to advance democracy and human rights only occur when they are in agreement with other interests. Shortterm realist interests also reveal, in certain cases, that democracy promotion does not even exist at all; the U.S. does not intervene or interfere in certain states where other U.S. interests have a higher priority than supporting democracy. China, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Russia, are sites where security and economic interests override the interest of supporting a democracy (Carothers 2007). Furthermore, lack of clarity and consistency in policies has wrongly entangled democracy promotion with military and security interests. Security, for any state, including the U.S. is critical to a state‘s survival. Indeed, first and foremost, security is America‘s primary interest. Michael McFaul notes that the ―central purpose of American power is not to make the world a better place, but first to ensure security, prosperity of American people‖ and the ―paramount objective of American foreign policy must always be to defend the security of the American people‖ (McFaul 2010, 10, 68). Deterring military foes, forging alliances, creating alliances, ensuring stable access to natural resources, creating and maintaining U.S. military bases, expanding trade and investment opportunities abroad all represent strategies to ensure American security and, therefore, generally precede other policies (United States 2010). However, security is not, nor should not, be the sole interest of U.S foreign policy. Foreign policy, must take other interests into account; clearly, ―Not all interests need to be vital to be worthy of American protection‖ (Haass 1995, 48). A. The Case for Wilsonianism A Wilsonian view of foreign policy and also democracy promotion states a U.S. interest in upholding moral values. The U.S. has a moral obligation to human rights, and here democracy promotion is not simply a tool for national interest. Democracy promotion is seen as an end in itself that promotes human rights values, quality of life, economic, political and social liberties. In rhetoric, America‘s stated interests for promoting democracy are normally Wilsonian ideals associated with supporting human empowerment and self-determination and the wish that democratic values are shared globally. Critics have deemed this view to be limited in the scope with which it can substantiate a policy action to promote democracy. Richard Haassargues, ―The principal problem with this thinking is that the active promotion of democracy is a luxury policymakers cannot always afford‖ (Haass 1995, 46). Further critiques note that there may still be instances where national security or economic interests override supporting democratic values. When it comes to human rights, nowhere have the conflicts and contradictions been greater than in Washington‘s dealings with superpowers. Haass continues, ―When it comes to relations with Russia or China, Saudi Arabia or Egypt, other national security interests must normally take precedence over (or at least coexist with) concerns about how they choose to govern themselves. During the early Bush administration certain neo-conservatives appropriated ―the fact that promoting democracy can be difficult and expensive also reduces its attraction as a foreign policy compass‖ as another means to highlight the apparent conflicting interests associated with democracy promotion (Haass 2005). B. The Case for Realism Realists emphasize the balance of U.S. power amongst other global actors through the maintenance of security. ―This theory prescribes that the U.S. has a security interest in increasing its military and economic power and fostering and maintaining alliances with powerful states to check the influence of other great or rising powers‖(McFaul 2010, 76). Above all else, maintaining a balance of power is ideal. U.S. needs access to oil, minerals, basing rights and trade from all countries willing to cooperate, irrespective of whether they are autocratic or democratic. Realists argue that democracy promotion can undermine allies, empower anti-American forces and generate both domestic and international instability. In the case of Egypt, for instance, supporters of Mubarak and Mubarak himself, argued that democratization could give way to the empowerment of non-western friendly actors, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and ultimately destabilize the Middle East region (Embassy Cairo 2010).Haass acknowledges ―The strength of the realist approach is that it does not overlook existing and potential threats to U.S. interests, threats that if they were to materialize could overwhelm policy concerns‖ (Haass 1995, 48). C. Democracy Promotion as a Tool, Rather Than an End Here is where focus on short-term realist interests prompts a lack of clarity and consistency in policies. Under a realist school of thought, democracy promotion is seen as a tool rather than an end. It can be emphasized as a strategy to ideally secure other interests. Consequently, democracy promotion, when it exists, can become entangled with military and security interests; or, democracy promotion may not exist at all where other strategic interests are already present. Still, there are cases where democracy promotion doesn‘t even exist at all; the U.S. does not intervene or interfere in certain states where other U.S. interests have a higher priority than supporting a democracy. U.S. military presence in the Middle East prompts the need for allies in the region. Pakistan represents one instance; Pervez Musharraf maintained control of Pakistan with his power as a military dictator up until the 2008 elections. Security interests as well as economic interests play a significant role in undermining democracy promotion in the Middle East. U.S. oil interests invoke a more hardheaded foreign policy that disregards human rights and quality of life standards in states such as Algeria and Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, Michael McFaul notes, ―Without the illiberal kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a trade partner today, the U.S. would not have enough affordable energy to support our current way of life‖ (McFaul 2010, 79). On the same note, other countries with limited trade and aid relations to the U.S., such as Syria, will not experience the same policy with the U.S. as does Saudi Arabia, for instance. Economic and strategic interests have, in the past, prevented the U.S. from taking a firm stance against China‘s human rights violations. China, on the contrary, maintains a favored nation status. For the U.S., ―promoting human rights was jettisoned in May 1994 when the need to export to China and engage in a host of strategic efforts proved too significant to set aside‖ (Haass 1995, 53). Indeed U.S. leverage against China‘s human rights violations is supposedly limited due to economic interests that are present. Furthermore, when powers face a challenger to their hegemony, they are more likely to tolerate autocracies that can present themselves as buffer against their rivals (Levitsky and Steven and Way, 2002). The U.S. has been cited for supporting the ‗democrat‘ rather than the democracy where support for autocratic allies is emphasized over support for actual democratic institutions. This policy was seen in Egypt, prior to January 25, 2011, where the U.S. has provided billions of dollars in aid over the past several decades to prop up the Egyptian dictatorship. Supporters of this policy acknowledge the false assumption that elected parties will be in agreement with the U.S. and its foreign policy. They acknowledge that democratic elections could promote the rise of a fascist leader (Kopstein 2006, 89). Mubarak, has been cited frequently for human rights violations; detention, torture, refusal to register opposition political parties were all used by Mubarak as a means to constrain the scope of democracy and prevent a threat to his persistent rule (Untied States 2008). In Egypt, Mubarak profited from this Western concern that Islamists will win a fair election in the country. ―As evidence Mubarak can point to the parliamentary elections of 2005, when candidates backed by the Muslim Brotherhood captured a majority of the seats they contested‖ (United States 2008). Although the U.S. rarely placed pressure on Mubarak publicly, documents from WikiLeaks reveal U.S. pressure on Mubarak to democratize and to improve human rights. Nevertheless, ―U.S. pressure for democratization largely ended with the strong Muslim Brotherhood showing of 2005‖(United States 2008). Instances of supporting autocratic allies have happened frequently in U.S. foreign policy, and present a challenge to the consistency in rhetoric of foreign policy and democracy promotion in the future. D. Entanglement of Democracy Promotion with Military or Security Interests Inconsistency between rhetoric and action can also manifest itself when other U.S. interests, specifically military and security interests, become entangled with the act of promoting democracy. In the past decade, entanglement represents one of the greatest faults to American foreign policy and its association with democracy promotion consequently. Entanglement presented itself most distinctly within Bush‘s Freedom Agenda where military force became an instrument for democracy promotion and democracy promotion became associated with regime change. Here, McFaul comments that “During the Bush administration, the American armed forces assumed a leading role in fostering democratic change (McFaul 2010, 155). At times, the purpose for a military intervention can be disguised under the veil of democracy promotion. Or, similarly, democracy promotion becomes a façade to fulfill other interests, as was seen in Iraq. “The increasingly threadbare nature of initial US justifications for the invasion, (weapons of mass destruction, the Iraq-Al-Qaeda ‘link‘), rendered the language of democracy promotion an attractive fall-back for the administration" (Durac and Cavatorta 2009, 9). A close association between military intervention and democracy promotion overshadows the more traditional and legitimate means for supporting democratic development in other countries. In Iraq, policy makers fell back on democracy when all other legitimate reasons to invade couldn‘t be summoned. In cases like this, the act of using democracy promotion as a façade renders U.S. democracy promotion misleading and unfounded. IV. Undermining U.S. Credibility and Image A. Accusations of Hypocrisy The determinedness with which the Bush administration tied democracy promotion rhetoric to aggressive War on Terror military actions had the opposite of its desired effect. The U.S. had hoped that its preemption policy might be more palatable if couched in values that are almost universally agreed upon, like freedom and democracy. President Bush‘s statement ―For the sake of our long-term security, all free nations must stand with the forces of democracy and justice that have begun to transform the Middle East‖ implies that the U.S.‘s involvement in the Middle East is consistently aimed at supporting democratic movements. However, the fact that security is a much more immediate concern in military conflicts meant that, in practice, democracy was not the primary consideration when it came to which governments to support and which to challenge. Egypt, for example, is a close U.S. ally and enjoyed generous military support throughout the freedom agenda years despite being decisively authoritarian. On the other hand, the U.S. refused to support Hamas although it was democratically elected by the Palestinian people. While both of these decisions make sense from a geopolitical/security perspective, they do not fit the democracy promotion agenda. When President Bush made universal statements about democracy promotion while at the same time supporting non-democracies and failing to support all functioning democracies for security reasons, the international community recognized the hypocrisy. B. Accusations of Hubris Another way in which U.S. democracy promotion rhetoric helped undermine our credibility and image abroad has been by declaring success, or at least marked progress, in places where democracy, if it exists at all, is not functioning enough to improve the quality of life of citizens. By calling these examples successful, the U.S. either looks disturbingly out of touch or too haughty to admit the shortcomings of its democracy promotion efforts. Iraq is an excellent example of this, as Frank Rich of the New York Times points out: ―Iraq‘s ‗example of freedom,‘‖ as President Bush referred to his project in nation building and democracy promotion, did not inspire other states in the Middle East to emulate it. If Iraq is an example of success, who indeed would volunteer to be the next patient of U.S. democracy promotion? There are many other examples stretching back before the Bush era of similarly willfully inaccurate statements. Thomas Carothers points to the Congo, Cambodia, and Soviet-free Afghanistan as cases where the U.S. stubbornly congratulated themselves on progress that, to the rest of the world, looked like tragedy. Setting unrealistic expectations for the results of democracy promotion, such as President Bush‘s ―long-term goal of ending tyranny in our world, ―are another form of this hubris (Bush 2005). These two types of misleading rhetoric create a very stark image of U.S. democracy promotion in the eyes of the rest of the world. The U.S. claims to stand behind democratic forces in all states, but does not follow through when more immediate strategic concerns are present. Actions claimed to be democracy promotion are implemented with military coercion and claimed as successes even if they fail to provide security or stability for the country‘s citizens, and, in the case of Iraq, actively destabilize a region. As a result, ―the credibility of the US as an agent of democracy promotion in the Middle East is called into question, both within the region and without‖ (Bali and Rana, 2010). V. Implications for Diplomatic Effectiveness: Realism The preceding mistakes have resulted in ―Obama and his foreign-policy team edge[ing] away from the language of democracy promotion, which they fear that the Freedom Agenda has rendered toxic. (Taub 2009)‖ The new administration may feel the need to avoid Bush-era rhetoric that engendered so much criticism, but the associations of U.S. democracy promotion with aggressive militarism, hypocrisy, and arrogance will not disappear overnight. They must be replaced by a strong, realistic redefinition of what democracy promotion means to the U.S., when and how it will be practiced, and when it must take a backseat to other more immediate concerns. Once the U.S. rhetorically embraces realistic standards, it will be possible for policy and rhetoric to be consistent. This will present a reasonable face for U.S. democracy promotion, encouraging cooperation and discussion rather than avoidance or presumptive opposition. This is something U.S. policymakers should be concerned with for more substantive reasons than international popularity. Being seen as hypocritical and arrogant strengthens the case of foreign leaders seeking to oppose U.S. policy, both in international forums and bilateral relations. The U.S.‘s ability to achieve foreign policy objectives- be they economic, military, or geopolitical- is materially harmed by the perception that we have qualities undesirable in a working relationship. Unrealistic assessment of outcomes, inconsistency, unwillingness to recognize areas of weakness, and arrogance are all characteristics that do not invite support and cooperation. Indeed, McFaul asserts the Bush administration‘s rhetoric and policy in the Middle East were damaging to the U.S.‘s ability to realize foreign policy goals to the extent that they formed ―a serious impasse between the White House and all other international organizations, which subsequently tried to steer clear of associating with Bush policies, including his freedom agenda‖ (McFaul 2010, 218). It clearly follows that all U.S foreign policy goals are served by a positive and respected image abroad, because other states and international organizations are more willing to cooperate with policies when they have a positive image of U.S. goals and methods for achieving them. Certain aspects of democracy promotion have been identified as contributing to a negative image abroad:  Aggression/militarism  Unwarranted declarations of success/denial of mistakes  Inconsistency o Between rhetoric and action Between standards for various states Accordingly, attempts to foster a more positive, cooperative image should involve amending democracy promotion policy to be more:  Peaceful and non-coercive  Realistic o In assessments of progress and willingness to discuss/learn from mistakes o Rhetoric able to be achieved with action o Policies capable of being applied consistently across cases (flexible, humble) Incorporating these guidelines into a new coherent democracy promotion strategy will help the Obama administration avoid the backlash against Bush era mistakes. As previously mentioned Obama is already bringing his democracy promotion rhetoric down to a more realistic level, but he has not fully embraced all the changes necessary for a new effective era of democracy promotion. His administration‘s handling of the recent Egyptian protests is an indication of the need for clear, consistent rhetoric that can be employed in situations where democracy promotion and other interests conflict. This is already acknowledged in private. A cable sent from the U.S. Embassy in Egypt in 2008 admits that ―An ongoing challenge remains balancing our security interests with our democracy promotion efforts.‖ Yet instead of openly addressing this conflict in statements on Egypt‘s unfolding revolution, President Obama delivered ―ambiguous messages about an orderly transition‖ (Embassy Cairo 2008). More than two weeks into the protests, he issued a statement saying ―the future of Egypt will be determined by the Egyptian people‖ (Obama 2011). While this is certainly an improvement on former president Bush‘s coercive and idealistic rhetoric, it does not provide a clear policy on democracy promotion and its limitations. Inherent in the statement is a message of non-coercion, acknowledgement of the unpredictability of democratization efforts, and an unwillingness to burn bridges with current government authorities. All of these considerations should be stated publicly and result from a clearly defined U.S. policy on democracy promotion that commits to realistic goals and recognizes that other interests like regional security must play a role in immediate decisions without endangering the long-term process of democratization. A. Non-coercion: Separating Immediate Security Concerns from Democracy Promotion Efforts As later sections of this paper will discuss, successful democratization is a long-term process requiring diverse economic and civil society development. While it is possible to destabilize a dictatorial regime through military or economic coercion, removing one undemocratic government does not automatically- or even usually- usher a functioning democracy into power. Therefore coercion is rarely a useful tool in democracy promotion efforts. More frequently, as described earlier in the chapter, democracy promotion ends up being used as a justification for otherwise unpopular coercive actions. Iraq is the most recent and most blatant example of military coercion justified by democracy promotion rhetoric, but understood by most politicians to be a strategic attempt to gain influence in the oil-rich Middle East. Cuba provides an excellent example of economic coercion in the name of democracy. If the sanctions imposed by the U.S. really were an attempt to force a democratic transition, the decades of unperturbed socialism since their implementation would have proven this method a failure. The fact that the embargo remains intact proves other strategic interests are at stake. If the U.S. can refrain from using democracy promotion rhetoric to justify coercive policies, foreign governments and citizens will be less likely to balk at the idea of allowing the U.S. influence in their country. Later sections of this paper will elaborate on strategies for peaceful and non-coercive democracy promotion. This should be a policy that the U.S. is firmly committed to. Not only does it adhere to a basic moral commitment to human rights, peace, and stability, as outlined previously, by showing respect for state sovereignty and international cooperation it will also increase the ability of the U.S. to achieve foreign policy goals through diplomatic channels. Matthew Longo agrees that ―Without question, military power is important, but it is not the only road forward. Nor is it always the best agent for change. The message of democracy-promotion abroad is not well-delivered from the opposite end of a gun‖ (Longo 2010). This is not a call for the U.S. to withdraw its foreign military presence or adopt a pacifist attitude; far from it. It simply urges that democracy promotion rhetoric not be used as a decoration to make military action more palatable. Security rhetoric can be militant, but for the sake of effectiveness in the international arena, democracy promotion rhetoric should be non-coercive. B. Achievable Rhetoric The second point, realistic assessment of progress in democracy promotion efforts, is crucial in order to achieve consistency between rhetoric and action. If the government makes grandiose statements about democracy promotion, as were common under Bush‘s Freedom Agenda, it will be hard pressed to live up to them. Eliminating tyranny entirely is a noble goal, as is supporting all democratic movements worldwide, but the truth is that the U.S. government is in no position to actually do either of those things. It cannot achieve consistency between rhetoric and action if rhetoric is unrealistic. This is not to say that there is no place for lofty or inspiring language. On the contrary, it often plays an important role in motivating populations to organize for democratic change. What is essential is that lofty rhetoric not be confused with actual commitments to act or expected outcomes of an action. For example, instead of claiming a completely free and democratic Middle East to be the goal of a policy like the Freedom Agenda, U.S. politicians could state that all citizens of Middle Eastern states deserve to have their basic rights and freedoms protected by accountable, responsive governments. It is entirely possible to reinforce a commitment to human rights and quality of life for all people without making specific claims about the U.S.‘s own power to reshape the world as it sees fit. C. Realism Allows for Consistency In addition to rhetoric about goals and actions being realistic in scope, it must also be as consistent as possible with actual U.S. interests, policies, and actions. Clearly this is not possible in all areas of foreign policy, particularly security and intelligence, but for democracy promotion it is largely possible and in fact helpful in many ways. Cavatorta and Durac point out that often, ―rather than being interested in democratic reform for its own sake, the US propounds democracy in the hope and expectation that it will deliver outcomes which the US desires.‖ It is important not to confuse democracy promotion for its own sake with democracy promotion used as part of a strategy to make a state less hostile to U.S. interests, be they economic, military, or political. This distinction is important because, as previously stated, democracy promotion is a long-term and contextually sensitive project and is unlikely to succeed as part of a short-term effort to affect specific strategic variables. Thus, if democracy promotion is tied to such projects rhetorically, it will seem to have a low success rate and diminish our credibility. If, however, it is made clear that the U.S. is seeking a strategic outcome, for instance permission to build a military base in a foreign state, and democracy promotion is one of many tools being employed to towards this end, no unrealistic expectations are raised. In this case, the U.S. appears pragmatic rather than blindly optimistic. Being clear and realistic rhetorically about the desired short-term and long-term outcomes of policies will improve the image of the U.S. as an international actor and restore credibility to its democracy promotion efforts. When democracy promotion is indeed the priority of a given project, it will be more successful and contribute to a more admirable and diplomatically effective U.S. when mistakes are recognized, discussed in a cooperative forum, and amended for future projects. Democracy promotion, like any process, will stagnate if unsuccessful models are ignored and allowed to proliferate because of a desire to save face. It is time to stop ―using transitional language to characterize countries that in no way conform to any democratization paradigm‖ and earn back the respect of the democracy promotion community (Carothers 2007, 4). D. Realism Encourages Multilateral Cooperation A further benefit to realistic assessments of progress beyond image repair is the possibility for greater international cooperation on democracy promotion projects. Discussions among democracy promoters about the successes and challenges of particular cases will not only foster a sense of shared goals, but also allow for faster and more effective revisions of unsuccessful tactics. Multilateralism has many benefits that will be more thoroughly discussed later in the paper, but most simply it will make us less vulnerable to accusations of arrogance. Exemplifying the willingness to cooperate and take criticism that we would like to see in other states will only bolster our credibility and effectiveness in the diplomatic arena. VI. Conclusion Improving the image of the U.S. abroad will increase its effectiveness in all aspects of foreign policy. Creating a clear, consistent democracy promotion policy that recognizes the need to compromise between immediate strategic interests and long-term democratization efforts is necessary to eliminate accusations of hubris and hypocrisy so common since the Bush Administration‘s Freedom Agenda. President Obama has made steps in the right direction, but has yet to present a cohesive, transparent democracy promotion policy to the public.

#### Policymakers must address catastrophic risks

Richard Allen Posner (born January 11, 1939) is an American jurist, legal theorist, and economist who is currently a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Chicago and a Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School. He is an influential figure in the law and economics school of thought. 2004 CATASTROPHE RISK AND RESPONSE

And here is a paradox: despite their much more powerful apparatus of inquiry, scientists are more tentative than lawyers. Scientists talk more in terms of "theory" and "hypothesis" and "data" and "belief" than of "fact" and "truth," which are terms that pervade legal discourse. Obviously there are many scientific facts and scientific truths, but they are not the focus of interest. In Karl Popper's influential theory of scientific inquiry, the march of science is a process of error correction, and truth its ever-receding goal. That way of thinking is alien to the legal profession. A lawyer says, "My client is innocent, and that's the truth." More than a rhetoric of certitude is involved. Lawyers inhabit a plane of inquiry where facts are salient, such as the date of an automobile accident or the date the plaintiff filed his case. Even in this age of science, their concern is mainly with the visible everyday world, the world navigable by common sense. For present purposes, the deepest difference between law (and other social sciences) and the natural sciences may be that the orientation of the former is toward action and of the latter toward knowledge. That is one reason scientists cannot be entrusted with the defense of the nation and the human race, whether it is defense against the public enemy or (an overlapping category) against the catastrophic risks with which this book is concerned. This is not a criticism of science or scientists. To seekers after knowledge, measures of protection against dangerous knowledge, such as knowledge of how to use gene splicing to create a more lethal pathogen, are simply an impediment, and the value of astronomical skills in crafting a defense against asteroid collisions simply an irrelevance.

#### Overemphasis on method destroys effectiveness of the discipline

Wendt**,** Handbook of IR, 2002 p. 68

It should be stressed that in advocating a pragmatic view we are not endorsing method-driven social science. Too much research in international relations chooses problems or things to be explained with a view to whether the analysis will provide support for one or another methodological ‘ism’. But the point of IR scholarship should be to answer questions about international politics that are of great normative concern, not to validate methods. Methods are means, not ends in themselves. As a matter of personal scholarly choice it may be reasonable to stick with one method and see how far it takes us. But since we do not know how far that is, if the goal of the discipline is insight into world politics then it makes little sense to rule out one or the other approach on a priori grounds. In that case a method indeed becomes a tacit ontology, which may lead to neglect of whatever problems it is poorly suited to address. Being conscious about these choices is why it is important to distinguish between the ontological, empirical and pragmatic levels of the rationalist-constructivist debate. We favor the pragmatic approach on heuristic grounds, but we certainly believe a conversation should continue on all three levels.

### 1AR